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I. Introduction 
 
            “But those damn little offshore islands…sometimes I wish they’d sink.”  
                    – Dwight D. Eisenhower, February 16, 19551 
 
 Ike was referring to two small island chains, Quemoy and Matsu, located a few miles off 
the coast of Mainland China, across from Xiamen and Fuzhou, respectively.  Since the entire 
length of the Chinese coast is littered with thousands of such islands, the President’s bitterness 
might seem unwarranted, but Quemoy and Matsu were nothing like the other islands.  Despite 
their proximity to Mainland China—both lie almost entirely within the Mainland’s twelve 
nautical mile (NM) territorial waters, and a mere 1,000 yards separate Quemoy and Xiamen at 
their nearest points2—these two island chains have remained under the administration of Taiwan 
since the Nationalist defeat in 1949.   
 Throughout the 1950s, the offshores repeatedly came under siege by the PRC, inspiring 
heated international debates about their legal status, and the appropriateness of foreign 
intervention in their defense.  Several world leaders weighed in with their opinions, including 
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Japanese Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, and French 
Prime Minister Edgar Faure.  Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson asked, “Are any of us 
really willing to go to war to help repel an attack on these ‘offshore’ islands?”3  U.S. Navy 
Admiral Harry Yarnell declared that “these islands are not worth the bones of a single 
American.”4  And in 1960, John F. Kennedy publicly questioned the logic of defending Quemoy 
                                                          
1 Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (1985), 102 
2 Lewis, “Quemoy and American China Policy” (1962), 13 
3 Clubb, “Formosa and Offshore Islands” (1959), 527, 531 
4 John F. Kennedy. “October 13, 1960 Debate Transcript”  
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and Matsu, suggesting that the U.S. “line should be drawn in the sea around the island [Formosa] 
itself.”5  Nevertheless, despite the divergent polemics, the offshores became the proximate cause 
of both the First (1954-55) and Second (1958) Taiwan Strait Crises, during which the Chiang 
regime buffaloed the Eisenhower administration into not only providing combat and materiel 
support to Nationalist forces on the islands, but even flirting with the possibility of nuclear war.6   
 After a brief “invasion scare” in 1962, the offshore islands began to fade from the public 
view.  A keyword search of “Quemoy” and “Matsu” in the New York Times archives shows that 
islands graced the pages of the newspaper no less than 1,000 times in separate articles from 
1954-1962, roughly equivalent to an article every three days.  By contrast, during the years 1985-
2017, the same search yields just over 100 results, or about three appearances per year.7  The 
islands’ stark transformation, from household name and geopolitical epicenter to a mere 
historical footnote, is all the more astounding when one considers that the realities of the 
situation have changed very little.  Certainly, the artillery has stopped firing, and fighter planes 
no longer darken the skies in their duel for air superiority, but when the fog of war had lifted, 
nothing had actually been resolved.  The islands remain under Taiwan administration; the U.S. 
still maintains its dubious commitment to Taiwan’s defense, and its perennially ambiguous 
position on the offshores; and the PRC still unwaveringly asserts its determination to complete 
                                                          
5 Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (1985), 132 
6 The U.S. management of the 1st and 2nd Strait Crises, as well as the 1962 Invasion Scare, will be covered in some 
length in a later section. 
7 The number of articles during the period from 1954-1962 is likely much higher than 1,000, but the author 
discontinued his search after reaching that number, since it adequately demonstrated a disproportionately high 
volume of reporting when compared with the time block from 1985-2017.  In the latter period, search parameters 
were even expanded to include the terms “Kinmen”/“Jinmen” and “Mazu,” alternative transliterations of the 
Mandarin pronunciation of the islands’ Chinese names, 金门 and 马祖, respectively.  (The relative usage of 
“Quemoy,” an early adaption from local Fujianese, has decreased over the last several decades.)  The year 1985 
was chosen as the left limit, since that is when Thomas Stolper observed the sharp decline in public interest.  There 
was only one article published in 2016, and none so far in 2017.  All search results obtained at 
https://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/.   
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the reunification of China, with force if necessary.  The U.S., PRC, and Taiwan have all been 
content to kick the can down the road while cross-strait relations remain frozen in an unstable 
and brittle status-quo.  However, what if the status quo changes?  Have we heard the last of 
“those damn little offshore islands?”  That is precisely the question this paper will attempt to 
answer.   
 The government of Taiwan currently administers at least eight inhabited islands, rocks, or 
reefs distinct from the main island of Taiwan, and claims sovereignty over the uninhabited 
Senkaku/Diaoyu rocks in the East China Sea.  This paper concludes that five of these features, 
i.e. the Quemoy and Matsu chains, Itu Aba, Pratas, and the Pescadores (hereafter, The Five 
Islands), will retrocede to the Mainland in the future, regardless of Taiwan’s status apropos of 
independence, and therefore cautions the U.S. Government against repeating the mistakes of 
previous Strait Crises, especially regarding military intervention.   
 The inclusion of the latter three islands—Itu Aba, Pratas and the Pescadores—is the most 
controversial aspect of this discussion.  For seasoned China hands, a discourse confined purely to 
the Offshore Islands (Quemoy and Matsu) might appear wholly unoriginal, at least initially, 
since there is already a substantial and diverse body of literature on both, especially Quemoy.    
 For example, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, when PRC aggression ushered the 
Offshores to forefront of global attention and reshaped them from a rural backwater into a Cold 
War battleground, scholars and foreign policy experts like John Wilson Lewis, Don E. Kash, 
Stanley Hornbeck and O. Edmund Clubb wrote extensively about U.S. policy on the Offshores 
and its implications for regional and global security.  As mentioned, the Offshores were often 
front-page news during this period; nor were they strangers to political commentary and debate.  
However, nearly all the resulting theory, analysis and opinion suffered from the same two 
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blameless yet serious misapprehensions: 1) it believed that fighting on the offshores was a 
military operation with military objectives, rather than military theater with political objectives8; 
and, 2) it failed to predict the imminent PRC-U.S. rapprochement.   
 After the U.S. normalized relations with the PRC in 1979, experts had achieved enough 
distance from the 1st and 2nd Strait Crises to undertake the project of historical revisionism.  
Through the benefit of hindsight and an emerging body of evidence, scholars such as Thomas 
Stolper, Gordan H. Chang and the PRC academic He Di have shown that both Mao Zedong and 
Chiang Kai-Shek regarded the Offshores as strategically important but minimized their 
importance as operational or tactical objectives.  In fact, these experts suggest that the Offshores 
were more of a “hot potato” than a prize, and that both regimes were determined that the specific 
sovereignty of the islands remain an open question, indistinct from the more general question of 
political sovereignty over all of China, including Taiwan.  The late Nancy Bernkopf-Tucker’s 
exhaustive interviews with contemporary diplomats and policy advisors have also proven 
invaluable in uncovering additional evidence to support this view.  
 In his landmark 2008 study, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line, Michael 
Szonyi explores the human dimension of conflict on Quemoy and how the protracted “state of 
exception” there justified an oppressive regime exercising a nearly perfect form of “biopolitical” 
power over its citizens.  Spanning nearly forty years, the KMT-led process of “militarized 
modernization” on Quemoy and Matsu produced “local inflections” of “geopolitical forces” that 
set life on the Offshores apart from elsewhere in the “Republic of China,” and left an indelible 
mark on the local economy and society. The unique historical experiences on Quemoy and 
Matsu have therefore resulted in the emergence of distinct political and cultural identities among 
                                                          
8 This concept of “military theater with political objectives” will be developed more fully in the sections that follow, 
particularly in Section V.1.B. 
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their residents, a subject examined in depth by Taiwan researchers Wei Jiansheng and Chen 
Caineng, who have undertaken important studies of local identity on Quemoy and Matsu, 
respectively.  
 All of these studies serve as valuable sources of information, and most of them will be 
cited again at some length below.  However, while Quemoy and Matsu factor heavily their 
discussions, there are only scattered references to the Pescadores, and no mention at all of Itu 
Aba and Pratas.  Of course, the Pescadores feature prominently during various episodes of 
Chinese history but have lain dormant—as a subject of geopolitical discourse—since 1949.  Itu 
Aba and Pratas often appear in news reports within the context of the South China Sea dispute, 
but that issue involves multiple state actors and typically does not focus on Itu Aba and Pratas 
through the narrower of lens of Mainland-Taiwan bilateral relations.  Most significantly, the 
present author’s research has failed to yield a single source which links the territorial status, 
strategic function and political future of The Five Islands in any meaningful way, or even poses 
the question of a post-independence environment for them.  This paper argues that it is important 
to do both.  Quemoy’s and Matsu’s strategic function in cross-strait relations has migrated and 
evolved along with the PLA’s operational reach and war-fighting capacity, and the enlargement 
of China’s comprehensive power and foreign policy experience.  It is essential to extend the 
boundaries of the discussion, lest the U.S. find itself again caught unawares in a potential, and 
perhaps inevitable, “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.” 
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II. Scope and Organization 
 
 If past is prologue and history repeats itself—or at least rhymes—an assessment of 
history is a logical starting point for predicting the future of Taiwan’s outer islands.  It is 
certainly possible, even likely, that the PRC has included island contingencies in its calculus of 
cross-strait military options, but such plans, if they exist, are undoubtedly classified.  Until a 
traitor or spy posts them on WikiLeaks, they are pure speculation.  Governments are often quick 
to outline broad strategic goals, but reluctant to detail specific policies or courses of action.  For 
example, in Article 8 of the 2004 Anti-Secession Law, China reserves the right to “employ non-
peaceful means and other necessary measures” to prevent the formal separation of Taiwan,9 but 
it does not elaborate on which substantive “means” or “measures” it might “employ.”  Similarly, 
through Section 2, paragraph 6 of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. government affirms a 
policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of 
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on 
Taiwan.”10  This language is equally ambiguous.  Does “capacity” equal commitment?  Does 
“resist” imply military resistance, or economic sanctions, or simply a firm protest lodged through 
the U.N.?   
 The PRC has never officially aired an intention to seize one of Taiwan’s outer islands by 
force as a symbolic “shot over the bow,” just as the Taiwan authorities have never publicly 
acknowledged that a formal declaration of independence entails the sacrifice of the offshore 
islands (Quemoy and Matsu), and the U.S. has never yet categorically established “red lines” for 
Chinese coercion in the Taiwan Strait; that does not mean that these eventualities are any less 
                                                          
9 Chinese Embassy, “Anti-secession Law,” http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm  
10 U.S. Congress, “Taiwan Relations Act” (1979), https://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html 
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possible, or less probable.  Therefore, this paper draws inferences from historical events and 
facts, and interprets historical policies and documents, to form a conclusion that is admittedly 
hypothetical.  Then again, when is the future ever factual?  It is left to the reader to judge the 
strength of the arguments which follow. 
 This paper is organized into six remaining sections.  The next section will introduce the 
five island features in question, i.e. Quemoy, Matsu, the Pescadores, Itu Aba, and Pratas, and 
provide a general overview of their geography, demographics, economy, culture and history.  
This treatment is necessarily brief, and includes only that information which is germane to the 
central themes of this paper.  Physical location, ethnic identity, and history are particularly 
important, as these often aggregate to form assumptions which underwrite sovereignty claims 
and irredentist ambitions.   
 The second section explores the basis of each sides’ (the PRC and Taiwan) sovereignty 
claims, with special attention to relevant history, formal declarations, treaty language, and expert 
global opinion.   Legitimacy is crucial, not only to justify an aggressor’s violent actions, but to 
induce passivity in neutral or invested bystanders.  A sufficiently strong sovereignty claim might 
restrain a bystander nation poised on the cusp of intervention, and convince it to redraw its red 
lines, not because the aggressor nation’s rationale is so compelling, but because it lets the 
bystander “off the hook.” 
 The third section examines the evolving tactical and/or strategic value of each outer 
island in turn.  The geopolitical landscape has morphed considerably in the 55 years since the 
last offshore crisis in 1962—so has the U.S.-Taiwan-PRC military balance.  Understanding how 
and why the islands have been important to both sides of the strait is key to understanding the 
armed conflicts of the 1950s and for demystifying the relative peace of the last five decades. 
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 The fourth section takes stock of PRC, U.S., and Taiwan public opinion and political 
trends regarding the islands.  Taiwan opinion suggests a tacit admission that Quemoy and Matsu 
cannot survive as part of Taiwan indefinitely, but the same assumption does not hold true for the 
other three island features in question.  The failure to correlate their fates contributes to the 
likelihood that the U.S. and Taiwan might make the same mistake Eisenhower and Chiang made 
in the 1950s; that is, they could conflate the destiny of the outer islands with the destiny of 
Taiwan itself.  This section will also examine the possibility of a local or general referenda 
relinquishing Taiwan’s sovereignty over Quemoy and Matsu.   
 The fifth section analyzes U.S. policy decisions during the 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait 
Crises.  While significant institutional learning has occurred since 1958, the incidents are 
nevertheless excellent case studies and potential blueprints for U.S policy in future strait crises.  
This is especially true if the U.S. government does not anticipate the involvement of Itu Aba, 
Pratas, and the Pescadores in a future scenario.  When comparing apples with oranges, 
governments sometimes forget that both are still fruit. 
 The sixth section enumerates three plausible scenarios for an altered status quo in cross-
strait relations, and illustrates how all of them lead inexorably to retrocession.  Finally, the paper 
concludes with a policy recommendation for the U.S. government.   
 Before proceeding with the analysis, a brief note should be made regarding naming 
conventions.  This paper does not depart from the historical usage of Quemoy, Matsu, the 
Pescadores, Itu Aba, and Pratas, although the current preferred transliterations for these five 
features are Jinmen, Mazu, Penghu, Taiping Island, and Dongsha Island, respectively.  The 
author abides by the traditional convention for two reasons.  First, it establishes continuity with 
the bulk of Western literature and commentary, and therefore minimizes confusion.  Second, it 
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avoids affording nominal “island status” to Itu Aba and Pratas, a politically charged subject 
following the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague last summer.11  Lastly, 
the names Quemoy, Matsu, the Pescadores, Itu Aba, and Pratas will be used to refer to all greater 
and lesser islands within their respective chains.  Hereafter, if a feature is referred to as an island, 
it does not reflect the author’s endorsement of that feature as an island in the legal sense.   
 
III. Dramatis Personae: The Five Islands 
 
 This paper conspicuously ignores many of Taiwan’s other outer islands.  As mentioned 
above, Taiwan citizens inhabit at least four others, and Taiwan claims a fifth uninhabited group.  
There are also dozens of small offshore islands dotting the near coastal waters of Taiwan.  Why 
have these other islands been omitted from this analysis?  In any reunification scenario, whether 
peaceful or otherwise, it is quite certain that all of Taiwan’s islands would be restored to the 
Mainland, along with Taiwan itself.  However, this paper contends that Quemoy, Matsu, the 
Pescadores, Itu Aba and Pratas specifically will retrocede to the Mainland even if Taiwan 
achieves de jure independence.  A successful bid for independence implies that the PRC is either 
unwilling or has failed to reincorporate Taiwan by force, and will therefore opt for a more 
limited form of coercion and/or retaliation, of which outer islands seizures represent one 
component. 
 The paper established three selection criteria for predicting which outer islands the PRC 
will attempt to recover:   
                                                          
11 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “PCA Case Nº 2013-19” (2016), 259-260 
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 1) They must be located outside the rough line formed by the 12NM territorial boundary 
of Taiwan’s west coast; that is, sufficiently distant from Taiwan to allow bystander nations to 
reasonably differentiate between military actions against that island and a more general attack on 
Taiwan itself.   
 2) The PRC must possess a historical title to the island which is distinct from its 
sovereignty claims over Taiwan itself.  In this regard, the importance of legitimacy was already 
introduced in Section II above.   
 3) Seizure of the island must not unduly provoke any third-party claimants.  For example, 
Japan joins China and Taiwan in claiming ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.  A 
Japanese military officer explained that neither China nor Japan dared to deploy troops onto the 
islands because the results were so potentially explosive.12  The situation might be different if 
Taiwan had already stationed troops there, and Japan were accustomed to their presence.  
However, since that is not the case, Chinese occupation would risk a military confrontation with 
Japan which could easily get out of hand.   In contrast, Vietnam and the Philippines also claim 
Itu Aba,13 but Taiwan has occupied the island since 1956.14  Vietnam and the Philippines may 
not welcome or condone a PRC assault on the island, but they are unlikely to view the 
development as anything more than an internal affair between Taiwan and China.  After all, both 
countries adhere to a “One China” policy, and neither extends official diplomatic recognition to 
Taiwan.  The chart (Table 1) below demonstrates that only The Five Islands meet all three 
criteria outlined above.      
 
                                                          
12 Interview between the author and personnel from the G-1, Western Regional Army, JGSDF, conducted on April 
4, 2016 in Kumamoto, JP. 
13 Ford, “Itu Aba Might be the Key,” The Diplomat (April 30, 2016) 
14 Katchen, “The Spratly Islands,” Asian Survey (1977), 1179 
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Island Feature Criteria 
12NM Distance Historic Title No 3rd Party 
Agincourt   X 
Green Island   X 
Itu Aba X X X 
Matsu X X X 
Orchid Island   X 
Pescadores X X X 
Pratas X X X 
Quemoy X X X 
Senkakus/Diaoyu  X  
 
 
III.1. Itu Aba. 
 
 Chinese, including Taiwans,15 prefer to call this feature “Taiping Island” (太平岛, tai 
ping dao), although this title became controversial after The Hague’s ruling last summer, when 
U.S. diplomats, and perhaps other countries’ as well, were instructed to avoid using the term 
“island” in connection with Itu Aba.  Acceptable alternatives were Taiping, Taiping Reef (太平
礁, tai ping jiao)—moderately offensive to Chinese or Taiwan officials—or Itu Aba.16  Situated 
at 114° 22'E and 10° 23'N, Itu Aba is much closer to Hainan Province (539.6 mi.) than it is to 
Taiwan (700 mi.), and is centrally located within the Spratly formation.  With an area of 0.43 
km2, it is the largest natural feature in the Spratlys (南砂群岛, nan sha qun dao). 
 Itu Aba has no history of permanent settlement.  There is, however, a substantial record 
of intermittent visitation and temporary residence.  The Chinese claim to have been the first to 
                                                          
15 Throughout this paper, in accordance with State Department policy, “Taiwans” will be used to denote citizens of 
the so-called “Republic of China,” while “Taiwanese” denotes Taiwan natives or overseas Chinese who trace their 
lineage back to Taiwan in the pre-1949 era, to include aboriginals.  This distinction is equivalent to the difference in 
Chinese between guomin/国民 (Taiwans) and benshengren/本省人 (Taiwanese). 
16 The author was working at the American Institute in Taiwan when the PCA was published on July 12, 2016. 
Table 1 – Criteria for inclusion in study. (Source: The Author) 
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Figure 1 – Itu Aba and Pratas (Source: PCA, “PCA Case Nº 2013-19” [2016]: 9) (red markings added by the author) 
Itu Aba 
Pratas 
13 
 
officially discover it during the Yuan Dynasty in 1282 C.E.17  Later, there is some evidence to 
suggest Admiral Zheng He traveled there during his famous “Seven Voyages” between 1405-
1433.18  The Chinese Sea Directory (1868) and the Manual of Sea Routes (更路簿, geng lu bu) 
both record extensive use of Itu Aba as a semi-permanent base for Hainan fishermen up until the 
1930s.19  Guano mining was undertaken there in earnest during the 1920s by a Japanese mining 
company, with as many as 600 personnel living and working there for several years.20  During 
the Pacific War (1937-1945), Itu Aba served as a Japanese Naval Base, and was bombed by the 
U.S. Air Force.21  The Taiwan military occupied the island in 1956, and has never left.22 
 Currently, the island is garrisoned by some 200 Taiwan Coast Guard personnel.  
Infrastructure has been thoroughly developed, and the island boasts a runway capable of landing 
a C-130 cargo aircraft, a port facility, a 1-km highway, radar station, meteorological center, 
power plant, library, and activities center.23  Military personnel are equipped with medium to 
heavy weapons, including anti-aircraft guns and mortars,24 and the island, according to Taiwan 
Defense Minister Feng Shikuan, “has a strong defensive capability.”25  Although the surrounding 
waters support abundant marine life, and rich oil deposits have been discovered under much of 
the South China Sea (SCS) seabed, the island has no economy to speak of and the personnel 
                                                          
17 Katchen, “The Spratly Islands,” Asian Survey (1977), 1178 
18 Gao et al., “The Nine-Dash Line,” American Journal of International Law (2013), 100-101. 
19 PCA, “PCA Case Nº 2013-19” (2016), 245 
20 Ibid., 248 
21 Ibid., 249 
22 Katchen, “The Spratly Islands,” Asian Survey (1977), 1179 
23 PCA, “PCA Case Nº 2013-19” (2016), 179; Pike, “Taiping Island,” Federation of American Scientists (2000), 
https://fas.org/irp/world/taiwan/facility/taiping.htm 
24 Cole, “Neutralizing Contention,” The Diplomat (June 13, 2014) 
25 Chung, “New Facilities on Taiping Island,” The Diplomat (September 20, 2016) 
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there are completely dependent upon supplies from Taiwan.26  The PCA ruled that activities on 
Itu Aba are “entirely governmental in nature.”27  
 
III.2. Matsu. 
 
 Located at 26° 09’N and 119° 55’E, the Matsu (马祖, ma zu) chain is much closer to the 
Mainland than Taiwan, in what the PRC identifies as its “inland waters.”28  While over 100 miles 
of open water separate the tiny island from Taiwan, the Fujian port city of Fuzhou lies only 33 
miles away, and the Chinese coastal town of Huangqizhen is less than six miles from one of 
Matsu’s smaller islets.   
 Like Itu Aba, Matsu first appears in the historical record during the Yuan Dynasty, when 
fishermen migrated there from Fuzhou with their families.  However, during the chaotic 
transition between Ming and Qing rule, Japanese pirates dominated the islands.  With the 
ascendancy of the Qing Dynasty in the 17th Century, and a subsequent crackdown on piracy, 
Fujianese fishing settlements returned permanently.  In 1949, retreating Nationalists troops 
occupied Matsu in force and instituted strict martial law, or Battle Field Administration (BFA).  
During the 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait Crises, and throughout the Odd Days War (1958-1979), 
Matsu, like Quemoy, was regularly bombarded by PLA artillery.  There is still a significant 
Taiwan military presence on the island, but its size, composition and strength are not clear.  
Unlike the rest of Taiwan, where martial law was lifted in 1987, the BFA remained in effect in 
both Matsu and Quemoy until November 7, 1992.29  While fishing still plays a pivotal role in the 
                                                          
26 PCA, “PCA Case Nº 2013-19” (2016), 188 
27 Ibid., 251 
28 PCA, “PCA Case Nº 2013-19” (2016), 68 
29 Lianchiang County Council, “Introduction to Matsu,” http://www.mtcc.gov.tw/en/matsu.html  
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Figure 2 – Quemoy, Matsu and the Pescadores (Source: Taipei Air Station, “Chiayi Air Base 1958,” accessed May 1, 2017, 
http://taipeiairstation.blogspot.com/2013/03/chaiyi-air-base-1958.html) (red markings added by author) 
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Matsu economy, tourism has become increasingly important.  Statistics indicate that Matsu 
hosted 108,485 visitors in 2014.  Nearly 10% of those were from the Mainland.30 
 For Matsu’s population of over 12,000,31 their language and culture has more in common 
with neighboring Fujian Province than Taiwan.  In Taiwan, distinct local cultures, languages and 
ethnicities are represented by aboriginal (原住民 yuan zhu min), Hakka (客家, ke jia), and 
especially Hokkien (闽南, min nan) communities.  Matsu, by contrast, is primarily East 
Fujianese (闽东, min dong). In fact, Matsu is one of only two counties in Taiwan where min 
dong hua is the primary language, and is even spoken with a chang le—that is, a Mainland—
accent.  The other county is Kinmen County, i.e. Quemoy.32 
 
III.3. The Pescadores. 
 
 The Pescadores (澎湖, peng hu) are an extensive archipelago containing nearly 100 
distinct islands or islets, of which 20 are inhabited.  The islands occupy a strategic position 
roughly midway between the Mainland and Taiwan at 23° 34’N and 119° 33’E, although they 
are indisputably closer to Taiwan (30 mi.)—the nearest point on the Mainland is almost 80 mi. 
away.  With a surface area of over 127 km2,33 the Pescadores are the second largest of Taiwan’s 
outer islands.  Fishing is the most important industry, followed by agriculture (peanuts and 
                                                          
30 “馬祖地區截至 103年 12月份遊客人次,” https://www.matsu-nsa.gov.tw/gov/article.aspx?a=757&preview=y 
31 “截至去年 12/31地區總人口 12165人,” Matsu Daily, January 3, 2014 
32 E-mail correspondence with a research fellow at National Taiwan University, who is both native of Matsu and a 
specialist in Matsu culture. 
33 Penghu County Government, “Measure of the Area” (2012), 
http://www.penghu.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?serno=201111070003&mserno=201111070001&contlink=content/area.j
sp&level3=Y&serno3=201111070004 
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indigenous fruits), mining (agates)34 and tourism.  Tourism has become especially vital to the 
economy in recent years.  In 2016, 1,082,156 tourists—some 7% came from the Mainland35—
disembarked on Penghu, a nearly 10% increase from visitation the previous year (972,968).36  A 
2015 census pegged the permanent resident population at 102,304.37    
 The Pescadores’ history is particularly fascinating, especially because of the unique role 
they played as an entrepôt for commercial and cultural intercourse between the peoples of the 
Mainland and Taiwan, but also as a battleground for major power struggles.  The Pescadores 
have often been the first stop on the way to Taiwan.  It is important in this context to note that 
there is no evidence of a native population on the Pescadores distinct from the documented 
migration of Mainlanders after the 6th Century.  There is reason to believe that Chinese 
fishermen discovered them as early as 590 C.E. during the Sui Dynasty.38  The annals of history 
are quiet until 806, when a Zhejiang poet settled there and regularly exchanged written 
correspondence with associates on the Mainland.  During the Song Dynasty, Fujian Province 
ostensibly administered the Pescadores, and their records testify to frequent, often catastrophic 
raids on the islands by “island barbarians” (aboriginals) from Taiwan.  Yuan emperors stationed 
a military garrison there which was withdrawn in 1387 by the Ming emperor under pressure from 
Japanese pirates, or Wakou.  During this period, the Pescadores became a “haven” for Chinese-
led pirate fleets.  Ming Admiral Yu Tayu defeated a powerful pirate chieftain named Lin 
                                                          
34 “Penghu Resource Features,” Penghu Tour Web Site (2016), 
http://tour.penghu.gov.tw/en/Discover/index.aspx?item=3&mno=guxOXTYeG5o%3d&id=hJg!0!gDX5Z!1!Q%3d 
35 Gao, “澎湖大陆游客不及去年 3成,” 中国台湾网 (August 17, 2016) 
36 Penghu County Government, “105年度澎湖縣觀光人數統計總表” (2017), 
http://www.penghu.gov.tw/tourism/home.jsp?mserno=201307260001&serno=201307260001&contlink=ap\\\/un
it1_view.jsp&dataserno=201701090002 
37 Ibid., “Population” (2016), 
http://www.penghu.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?serno=201111070015&mserno=201111070001&contlink=content/2011
1229163334.jsp 
38 Chen, “The Pescadores,” Geographical Review (1953), 77 
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Taochen in a spectacular naval engagement near the islands in 1562, whereupon the Ming 
garrison was reestablished.39   
 The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) dropped anchor in the Pescadores in 1604 and 
again in 1624 but were induced to “evacuate these islands (which were Chinese territory) and in 
return to accept the cession of Formosa [Taiwan] (which was not).”40  The Chinese were 
“violently opposed” to the Dutch presence on the Pescadores, “which were regarded as sovereign 
Chinese territory.”41  To reiterate, the Chinese authorities in the 17th Century claimed direct 
sovereignty over the Pescadores, but not Taiwan.   
 Hereafter emerges one of the most intriguing characters in Chinese history, the pirate-
cum-emperor Koxinga (郑成功, Zheng Chenggong) who received a Ming imperial commission 
to harass Qing shipping and coastal settlements and who later launched a full-scale inland 
campaign in support of the Ming insurrection.  He embarked from his base at Quemoy in 1650, 
to which he returned in 1659 after a devastating defeat at Nanjing.  In Quemoy, he organized a 
massive invasion force and sailed for Taiwan in 1661, stopping in the Pescadores en route.  The 
same year, he defeated the Dutch at Fort Zeelandia and expelled the VOC from Taiwan 
permanently.  In southwestern Taiwan, he installed his own dynasty, the kingdom of Tungning 
(东宁, dong ning), and planned to build his army’s strength for a second grand campaign to 
defeat the Qing and restore the rightful Ming emperor to the throne.  One year later, Koxinga 
died, and 21 years after that, his grandson was soundly defeated in a great naval battle in the 
Pescadores in 1683.42  
                                                          
39 Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation (2005), 35-50 
40 De Bunsen, “Formosa,” The Geographic Journal (1927), 268 
41 Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation (2005), 50 
42 Ibid., 51-109 
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 The parallels which can be drawn between Koxinga and Chiang Kai-Shek are startling 
and adumbrative, and it is therefore not surprising that Chiang decided to coopt the Koxinga 
myth as both an archetype for his own quest to return to the Mainland and stamp out the 
Communists, and as an important symbol for legitimating his regime.  The image chosen for the 
first set of definitives (postal stamps) issued in Taiwan after the Nationalist retreat in 1949, was 
the figure of Koxinga. The next set of definitives presented Chiang in a similar style.43  On the 
other side of the strait, the PRC equally exalts Koxinga as “the man who firmly and irrefutably 
made the island of Taiwan an inalienable part of China,” and exhorts the PLA to “adopt the 
‘Koxinga spirit”; that is, to follow his glorious military example in the liberation of Taiwan.44   
 After 1683, the Pescadores remained firmly within the Qing sphere of influence until they 
were ceded to Japan in 1895 through Article 2.c. of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.45  The Japanese 
Instrument of Surrender, signed on September 2, obligated the Japanese to abide by the 
conditions enumerated in the 1945 Potsdam Declaration.  Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration 
upheld the Cairo Agreement of 1943, which demanded that Japan restore the Pescadores to 
China.  Also on September 2, General Douglas MacArthur issued his General Order No.1, 
directing the Japanese forces to “surrender [the Pescadores] to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
Shek.”46 KMT General Chen Yi arrived in Taiwan on October 25 to receive the Japanese 
surrender.47  The Taiwan authorities have administered the Pescadores ever since.  The islands 
were not directly involved in any of the Strait Crises, and the PRC has never yet engaged the 
islands militarily, unlike Matsu and Quemoy.  Nevertheless, a significant military presence 
                                                          
43 Deans, “Isolation, Identity, and Taiwanese Stamps,” East Asia (Summer 2005), 12 
44 Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation (2005), 84, 88 
45 “Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895,” USC US-China Institute, http://china.usc.edu/treaty-shimonoseki-1895 
46 “Retrocession of Taiwan,” National Palace Museum, 
https://www.npm.gov.tw/exh100/diplomatic/page_en04.html 
47 Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation (2005), 188-189 
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remains, but, as with all Taiwan troop deployments, their exact composition, disposition and 
strength is a matter of national security, and is therefore unclear.48   
 
III.4. Pratas. 
 
 At approximately 20° 40’N and 116° 48’E, Pratas is 100NM closer to the Mainland than 
to Taiwan, and is ensconced well outside the highly contested waters around the Spratlys and 
Paracels.  With a surface area of 2.4 km2, Pratas is nearly six times larger than Itu Aba, and 
sports an airstrip measuring nearly one mile in length.  The island is also equipped with a 
hospital, power station, fisherman’s service center, and three jetties.49  There is also a Taiwan 
military garrison, consisting of approximately 200 personnel from the Coast Guard and Air 
Force.  Like Itu Aba, the military forces on Pratas have substantial defensive weaponry, 
including anti-aircraft artillery.50   
 As with Itu Aba, there is decent evidence, e.g. the Manual of Sea Routes, to suggest that 
Chinese fisherman frequented Pratas as early as the Ming Dynasty, by which time the 
surrounding waters had become their “fixed fishing grounds.”51  However, like the rest of the 
island features in the South China Sea, it was not capable of sustaining permanent settlements 
without resupply.  Instead, it was used for harboring fishing vessels during inclement weather or 
shore rest.  In 1907, a Japanese merchant caused a contretemps between the Qing and Meiji 
                                                          
48 In a February 2016 trip to Quemoy, Matsu, and the Pescadores, the author observed multiple active military 
units and bases on all three islands.  Access was, of course, prohibited.  A 2001 article in the Naval War College 
Review estimated the total garrison at approximately 60,000, but it is unclear how this number was obtained, or 
whether it is still accurate. 
49 Pike, “Pratas Island Airfield,” Federation of American Scientists, 
https://fas.org/irp/world/taiwan/facility/pratas.htm 
50 Tkacik, Jr., “Removing the Taiwan Stone from Asia’s Great ‘Gō’ Game,” Chinese Business Intelligence (February 
28, 2012),  
51 Li et al. “Ancient Book ‘Provides Ironclad Proof,’” China Daily (May 24, 2016) 
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governments when he established a guano mine on the island.  The Qing sent a survey team to 
investigate, and concluded the affair by negotiating the purchase of his mining enterprise, and his 
departure from the island.  During the Pacific War, Japanese naval forces occupied the island.  
Then, in 1946, the Taiwan authorities installed a military garrison there, which remains to this 
day.52  Although Pratas was designated as a national park in 2009, it remains closed to the 
general public, except for academic research.53 
 
III.5. Quemoy. 
 
 Quemoy’s (金门, jin men) proximity to the Mainland has already been noted above.  It is 
certainly the closest of Taiwan’s outer islands at 24° 26’N and 118° 22’E.  It is also the largest, 
with a surface of over 150 km2.  The archipelago contains the main islands of Kinmen (金门, jin 
men) and Little Kinmen (列屿, lie yu), as well as 10 smaller islets, some of which are less than a 
mile from the Chinese coast.54   
 Local industry is limited, and generally confined to agriculture (sorghum, barley, 
soybeans, peanuts, etc.), livestock (cattle, pigs, and chickens), fishing, and, increasingly, tourism.  
One of the most lucrative enterprises is the state-owned Kinmen Gaoliang (sorghum) Liquor, 
which regularly generates over ¥9 billion in sales annually.  This constitutes a significant portion 
of county revenue, which often runs an annual budget deficit of ¥2 billion, covered through 
                                                          
52 Ma, “美哉海洋國家公園：東沙島歷史寫真簿,” 档案乐活情报 (October 16, 2012) 
53 Staff Writer, “Living on the disputed Dongsha Islands,” Taipei Times (September 18, 2010) 
54 Kinmen County Government, “Kinmen Awareness,” 
http://web.kinmen.gov.tw/Layout/main_en/AllInOne_en_Show.aspx?path=5709&guid=f40cd06f-a797-4e45-9164-
5bbc3399e1aa&lang=en-us 
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central government subsidies and aid.55  Tourism has become vitally important to the local 
economy: 1,553,251 tourists visited Quemoy in 2016, compared with 1,162,534 in 2011—an 
enormous increase.56  A significant share of these tourists come from the Mainland; in fact, over 
half as many Mainland Chinese (339,833) visited Quemoy in 2015 as did Taiwans (519,296).57  
As of February 2017, the permanent resident population of the island was 135,235, although this 
number does not include military personnel.58  Quemoy has a history of heavy troop 
deployments, and, while the numbers have certainly been reduced in recent decades,59 at various 
times has hosted as many as 100,000 Taiwan soldiers (in 1958)60 or roughly 1/3 of the entire 
Taiwan military (in 1962).61 
 The first waves of Mainland Chinese migration swept over Quemoy during the Tang 
Dynasty under an official named Chen Yuan.  The Song Confucian scholar Zhu Xi is known to 
have lectured students there in the 12th Century.  In the Ming and Qing era, many high ranking 
Chinese officials had studied for, taken and passed their imperial examinations on Quemoy.62  
This paper has already alluded to the island’s connection with the history of the “pirate king,” 
Koxinga.  Quemoy has long served as a gateway between Taiwan and the Mainland; hence its 
                                                          
55 Ibid. 
56 Kinmen Country Tourism Department, “观光人次统计表—105年,” 
http://web.kinmen.gov.tw/Layout/sub_D/NodeTree.aspx?path=2285 
57 National Immigration Agency, “表 17  金門地區歷年小三通人數統計,” 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/283_17.pdf 
58 Kinmen Country Civil Affairs Department, “金門縣 106年 2月份人口數統計表,” 
http://web.kinmen.gov.tw/Layout/sub_A/AllInOne_Show.aspx?path=16899&guid=353768fe-d9c2-4b2a-bff5-
b9e627b30821&lang=zh-tw 
59 Michael Szonyi pegs the figure at a very precise 10,709 in 2004, based on information obtained through a 
contact at the Jinmen Defense Headquarters (JDHQ). See Szonyi, Michael. Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front 
Line (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 257.  Although it has been fourteen years since this number 
was recorded, it accords well with the author’s own observations and stands as a fair approximation.   
60 Hornbeck, “The A,B,C’s of ‘Quemoy’ and Formosa,” World Affairs (Winter 1958), 106 
61 Lewis, “Quemoy and American China Policy,” Asian Survey (1962), 14 
62 Kinmen County Government, “Kinmen Awareness,” 
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name, which means the “golden door.”  Parenthetically, Koxinga’s son and successor, Cheng 
Ching (郑经, zheng jing)—the same Ching which forms part of the name of Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
own son, Chiang Ching-Kuo (蒋经国, jiang jing guo)—retained substantial possessions on the 
Mainland in the vicinity of Xiamen and Quemoy, where he held court while his chief minister, 
Chen Yung-Hua, administered Taiwan during his nearly 16-year absence.  This arrangement 
survived until March 28, 1680, when overwhelming Qing military pressure compelled him to 
definitely abandon all of his holdings on the Mainland and withdraw all remaining troops and 
subjects to Taiwan, where, like his father, he perished a year later.63  Nationalist forces on 
Quemoy executed a disciplined defense of the island in October 1949, decisively defeating a 
PLA amphibious assault.  This was the last time the PRC attempted a ground force invasion of 
Quemoy, and Taiwan has administered the island ever since.  Quemoy, like Matsu, was 
embroiled in the 1st and 2nd Strait Crises, and the “Invasion Scare” of 1962, but more will be 
written on these episodes below. 
 
IV. Looking for the Exits: Historic Title and Legal Precedent  
 
 The foregoing histories, albeit brief, should at least suffice to demonstrate that there is no 
historical evidence—as opposed to archaeological evidence, which is not explored in this paper, 
but which is experiencing an enlargement of its role in prosecuting maritime sovereignty 
claims64—of non-Chinese habitation on The Five Islands which pre-dates Chinese settlement.  It 
                                                          
63 Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation (2005), 95-106 
64 Bond et al., “Archaeology and the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, July 20, 2015; China’s extensive efforts to 
unearth archaeological evidence of Chinese occupation in the South China Sea underscore its confidence in its 
claims.  By contrast, the relative paucity of reporting on rival claimants’ archaeological activities could indicate any 
number of possibilities, e.g. poor publicity, lack of interest, insufficient funding, low confidence in outcomes, etc.   
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is also crucial to note that the Chinese migrants who first appear in the histories of the islands 
come from the Mainland, not Taiwan.  This section will synthesize and conceptualize these 
histories, and analyze the contents of various legal documents, to draw inferences about the 
nature and respective merits of the PRC and Taiwan positions.  It finds that these positions fall 
into two categories: 1) congruent and 2) opposing.  Congruency refers to sovereignty claims 
predicated upon a shared “One China” principle, wherein both sides of the strait generally agree 
on China’s geographic boundaries, but disagree on which political system should dominate 
within those boundaries.  Opposition, on the other hand, refers to claims based on distinct or 
competing interpretations of history or legal precedence, or contending assumptions about the 
prerequisites for sovereignty.  There is, of course, a possible third category, where aspects of 
both congruency and opposition might be invoked to support a claim.  The Five Islands fall into 
these categories as follows: 
1. Congruent   
a. Itu Aba 
b. Matsu 
c. Pratas 
d. Quemoy 
2. Opposing 
a. Pescadores 
 The concepts of congruency and opposition will be developed more fully below.  At this 
juncture, however, it would be instructive to introduce a second taxonomic framework, “Castles 
                                                          
Regardless, it would certainly be embarrassing for the Philippines, for example, if its own archaeological efforts 
only succeeded in uncovering Chinese artifacts. 
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and Kingdoms.”  Castles are centers and symbols of political and military power.  Within the 
walls of the castle, there are certainly limited forms of community and economy, but the castle’s 
raison d’etre is “entirely governmental in nature.”  Kingdoms, on the other hand, certainly 
contain castles within their boundaries, but they also contain metaphysically autonomous 
societies, which are much larger and more permanent.  The castle still serves as the organ of 
administrative power and political identity, but it exists to serve a society of subjects, at least in 
principle.   The social inhabitants of kingdoms often survive regime change.  The political 
inhabitants of castles do not.  The castle itself is often razed or relocated.  For example, the 
imperial seat of China has frequently moved, and the ruling dynasty has frequently changed, but 
the Chinese people have more or less remained.   
 The “Castles and Kingdoms” paradigm is relevant to understanding The Five Islands 
because the presence of “societies” on kingdom islands creates complications for Chinese 
offensive operations directed against them.  The presence of “subjects” outside the castle’s walls 
increases the likelihood of collateral damage and bystander outrage during a military conflict, 
and significantly elevates the risk of native insurgency and political resistance in the post-
conflict environment.  Assaults on castle islands, however, do not entail these “moral hazards” or 
strategic risks.  In this regard, an attack on a castle island is tantamount to destroying an enemy’s 
naval vessel at sea.  An attack on a kingdom island is like destroying the same vessel in the 
harbor, along with the surrounding community.  Both attacks might constitute an act of war, but 
the latter carries more strategic risk.   
 The paradigm is also important for highlighting that some islands contain civilian 
populations with a political will or cultural identity which may or may not closely align with 
governments on either side of the Taiwan Strait.  The will of the “subjects” on kingdom islands 
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could play a decisive role in shaping outcomes.  For example, if the citizens of Quemoy voted to 
retrocede to the Mainland, it could make it politically safer for the PRC to intervene in the event 
of a Taiwan military crackdown—reminiscent of Russia’s intervention in the Crimea incident—
or it could make it politically safer for the DPP to abandon the island.65  On castle islands, there 
is no such possibility, since all of the inhabitants are “drones” of the governmental “mother 
ship.”  If the military garrison on Itu Aba held a referendum to decide the island’s future, it 
would be tantamount to mutiny, and it would be utterly astonishing.   
 There is no need to elaborate on this concept any further.  It is sufficient to note that 
indigenous populations on islands necessitate special political and military considerations.  The 
terms “castle” and “kingdom” will be used repeatedly throughout the remainder of this paper to 
group the islands into their corresponding categories.  Predictably, The Five Islands can be 
classified as follows: 
1.  Castle Islands   
a. Itu Aba 
b. Pratas 
2. Kingdom Islands 
a. Quemoy 
b. Matsu 
c. Pescadores 
 
 
                                                          
65 The DPP’s ambivalent position on the offshore islands will be discussed in a later section of this paper.   
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IV.1. The Baby and the Bathwater: Taiwan’s Congruent Sovereignty Claims 
 
“Within the landscape of Taiwan’s [400 year] political history, you could almost say 
that Matsu was a foreign country.”66  
  
 For nearly 40 years (1949-1989), Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan was dominated by its 
“senior representatives,” those regional delegates who were elected to office on the Mainland in 
1947 and 1948 and continued to represent Mainland provinces after 1949.  In the late 1980s, 
DPP and other opposition party supporters called them “old bandits” because they were never 
entirely accountable to the Taiwan people and effectively “stole” seats in the various 
representative organs of the government, to which they were habitually re-appointed, rather than 
re-elected.  Until 1966, Taiwans could only cast their ballots in local elections, or for Taiwan 
Province’s limited seats in the national Yuan.  Even in 1966, when Taiwans began voting in 
supplementary elections—intended to flesh out the Yuan’s dwindling ranks as the “old line ward 
bosses” died or retired from office—Taiwan delegates still filled only 3% of the seats. 67 It was 
not until 1989, when the Supreme Court forced the senior representatives to relinquish all of their 
seats that the system of undemocratic appointments was abolished, and the Taiwan constituency 
was finally responsible for electing all members of the Yuan.68   In other words, for four decades 
after the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, the majority of national leaders represented 
constituencies and interests in Mainland China, not Taiwan.  The reader will recall that it was 
during the early part of these decades that the Nationalists began occupying and administering 
the islands of Quemoy, Matsu, Itu Aba, and Pratas.  
                                                          
66 Translated from 陈财能, “马祖: 正经边缘的认同游移,” 世新大學社會發展研究所碩士論文: 7; Original 
research paper obtained through correspondence with a research fellow at National Taiwan University. 
67 Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters (2014): 78 
68 Ibid., 79 
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 In August of 1953, approximately seventeen months before Chiang Kai-Shek withdrew 
from the Dachen Islands altogether, KMT General Hu Zongnan returned to Taiwan to take up a 
post at the National Defense University.69  The Dachens had served as the post-1949 Zhejiang 
provincial capital, and Hu had been Zhejiang’s last ROC military governor.  After 1955, the 
provincial administration was disbanded, leaving the KMT in physical control of only two 
provinces: Taiwan and Fujian, an arrangement which exists to this day.70  Many Westerners are 
surprised to learn that Taiwan still maintains these two separate provincial governments.  
Taiwan’s Fujian Province consists of Kinmen and Lianchang counties—that is, Quemoy and 
Matsu—and nothing else.  By contrast, Taiwan Province consists of everything else under the 
direct control of the Taiwan (or ROC) authorities.  This is an extremely important point: Not 
even the current Taiwan authorities consider Quemoy and Matsu to be a part of Taiwan 
Province.71   
 In 1935, the Chinese Nationalist Government—that is, the KMT under Chiang Kai-
Shek—established a commission to evaluate Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea 
(SCS).  The commission studied a variety of private historical sources, e.g. the Chinese Sea 
Directory and the Manual of Sea Routes, and published an atlas naming 132 features.  After the 
Japanese surrender, Chiang dispatched naval ships to the larger features in order to conduct 
surveys and erect Chinese markers.  Then, in 1947, the KMT circulated maps containing the now 
infamous eleven dash line—the PRC later lopped off two dashes in deference to Vietnam—and 
placed the Paracels, Spratlys, Macclesfield Bank and Pratas under the jurisdiction of Hainan 
                                                          
69 Hua, Yi. “胡宗南的最后人生,” 人民文搞 (2009): 50-51 
70 “國民政府的福建省與浙江省,” http://www.aiplus.idv.tw/soviet/LROCFKCK.HTM 
71 See the ROC Fujian Province government website at www.fkpg.gov.tw. 
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District, Guangdong Province.72  To be clear, Taiwan’s historic title to the islands in the SCS, 
including Itu Aba and Pratas, is identical to the PRC’s, and Chiang Kai-Shek himself placed the 
islands under the jurisdiction of Hainan, not Taiwan.  This latter decision is eminently logical, 
considering the islands’ early and frequent association with Hainan fishermen, discussed earlier 
in this paper.   
 The Treaty of Shimonoseki, Cairo Declaration, Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, 
and the Taiwan Relations Act all explicitly mention the Pescadores, but none of them names any 
of the four islands comprising Taiwan’s congruent claims, although the Spratly formation is 
mentioned in Chapter II, Article 2f of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty.73  How do we explain this 
omission?  For the two “castle islands,” the answer is fairly straightforward: they were not 
regarded as China’s natural territory and were therefore outside of the equation.74  For the 
“kingdom islands,” a sympathetic observer might argue that size was a decisive factor.  
However, it should be remembered that Quemoy, Matsu, and the Pescadores are quite similar in 
size.  In fact, Quemoy is the largest, and the islands in the Matsu archipelago are still large 
enough to support a permanent population of over 10,000 residents.  In the case of Quemoy and 
Matsu, a more compelling argument is distance, but this concedes a geographic superiority to the 
Mainland’s claim.75  Likewise, an argument based on the islands’ different experiences during 
the war with Japan also weakens Taiwan’s claims.  Japan annexed Taiwan and the Pescadores 
after the 1st Sino-Japanese War (1895), but waited until the 2nd Sino-Japanese War (1937) to 
                                                          
72 Gao et al. "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea,” The American Journal of International Law (2013): 100-
103 
73 Curiously, the San Francisco Treaty declines to mention Pratas, which was the only SCS island occupied by the 
ROC in 1951.  Treaty texts will be cited in a later section.  The Spratlys are also mentioned in the 1952 Treaty of 
Taipei.  
74 Recall the PCA award mentioned earlier in this paper, which rejected the legitimacy of China’s Nine-Dash Line. 
75 See island descriptions in Section III of this paper. 
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seize and occupy the other islands.  If Quemoy and Matsu have an existential or territorial 
connection with Taiwan, why did Japan neglect to add them to the terms of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki?  The answer is simple: Neither Japan, the U.S., PRC, nor Taiwan itself has ever 
regarded Quemoy and Matsu as anything other than an inalienable part of the Mainland.       
 Chiang Kai-Shek is said to have scrawled the Chinese characters for “redemption” (雪耻, 
xue chi) in the upper corner of his diary every day for twenty years, a quiet and private 
expression of his very public commitment to expunge the shame of China’s “Century of 
Humiliation” (百年国耻, bai nian guo chi).76  He never abjured his quest to retake the Mainland, 
and never regarded his sojourn in Taiwan as anything more than a temporary exile, a fact 
evinced by his fondness for the Chinese expression, “Never forget that you are in Chu” (毋忘在
莒, wu wang zai ju), which refers to a Warring States era tale of a ruler who withstood a siege at 
his last remaining stronghold in the city of Chu, and was subsequently able to recover the entire 
kingdom of Qi.77  Consequently, the KMT never acknowledged Taiwan’s independent claim to 
Quemoy, Matsu, Itu Aba or Pratas; rather, the ROC’s claim to these islands is indistinguishable 
and inseparable from its claims to all of China.  It was for this obvious reason that so many 
foreign observers scratched their heads and wrung their hands when it appeared that the U.S. 
might be willing to go to war with the PRC to prevent Quemoy’s and Matsu’s retrocession to the 
                                                          
76 Wang, Zheng. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. 
(2014): 80 
77 张建腾, “毋「忘」在莒誤編成毋「望」在莒,” 金门日报社, August 23, 2012, 
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but also notes that the realities of cross-strait relations suggest that the “mistake” might be nearer to the truth.   
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Mainland.  India, Canada, Japan and Great Britain all favored Nationalist withdrawal from the 
islands in the early months of the 1st Taiwan Strait Crisis, and Britain even attempted to lobby 
within the UN for a resolution to that effect; had it not been for U.S. opposition, such a 
resolution was liable to secure widespread international support.78  Nehru snorted that the 
offshore islands were “obviously” a part of Mainland China, and the Japanese flatly declared that 
they didn’t “want a war started over those islands.”79   
 Even within the U.S., expert opinion was divided.  There were several generals and 
politicians who openly challenged the U.S. decision to support the Nationalist defense of 
Quemoy and Matsu in 1955 and 1958.  After all, the U.S. had not swooped in to help Taiwan 
when the PLA overran Hainan in 1950, nor when PRC troops swarmed over the Dongshan or 
Zhoushan islands in 1955.80  The U.S. also maintained an inflexible position on the Yushan, 
Pishan, and Nanchi Islands.81  Nor should it be forgotten that the U.S. military did not help the 
Nationalists defend the Dachens after the PLA seized Yijiangshan in January 1955; instead, they 
merely assisted in the wholesale evacuation of Nationalist forces and civilian residents.82  These 
stark realities led some observers to ask: Why Quemoy and Matsu?  A fair question.  In the 
1950s, did the ROC have any more credible a claim to Quemoy and Matsu than it had for the 
Dachens, Nanchis, Hainan, or all of greater China for that matter?  The Senate Armed Services 
Committee’s 1959 “Conlon Report” seemed to reply in the negative when it recommended the 
discontinuation of U.S. support for the offshores, and the immediate withdrawal of Nationalist 
troops.83  Some scholars have argued that Quemoy and Matsu were more defensible than the 
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other islands due to their proximity to Taiwan,84 but this rationale does not constitute a legitimate 
title.   
  The historical episodes described above are crucial to understanding the basis of 
Taiwan’s congruent claims.  Neither Chiang Kai-Shek, nor his son and successor, Chiang Ching-
Kuo, nor in fact any Taiwan administration since, has ever proposed a separate sovereignty 
claim over Quemoy, Matsu, Itu Aba, or Pratas; that is, one which is distinct from the ROC’s 
more general claim to sovereignty over all of China.  Therefore, any bid for Taiwan 
independence will face the considerable challenge of justifying its continued occupation and 
administration of these islands.  When he visited Itu Aba on January 29, 2016, Taiwan President 
Ma Ying-Jeou delivered a speech in which he said: 
“Whether from the perspective of history, geography, or international law, the Nansha 
(Spratly) Islands, Shisha (Paracel) Islands, Chungsha (Macclesfield Bank) Islands, and 
Tungsha (Pratas) Islands, as well as their surrounding waters, are an inherent part of 
ROC territory and waters…This is indisputable.”85 
 
Later that year, PRC President Xi Jinping made the following statement in a press conference 
responding to the PCA award: 
“China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao [the South China Sea Islands], consisting 
of Dongsha Qundao [the Pratas Islands], Xisha Qundao [the Paracel Islands], Zhongsha 
Qundao [including Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal], and Nansha Qundao 
[the Spratly Islands].”86  
 
The congruity of their statements drives the point home.  If President Tsai Ing-Wen declares 
independence, will she revise Taiwan’s position to include only Itu Aba and Pratas?  Or will she 
still claim all of the Spratlys and Pratas, but exclude the other two formations?  Or will Taiwan 
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persist in claiming all maritime domains within the eleven-dash line, and merely forswear claims 
to continental China?  What about Hainan?  There is a farcical tautology in this line of inquiry 
which illustrates how a formal declaration of independence may very well impel Taiwan to 
throw out the baby with the bathwater, lest they risk contorting the reality of independence into a 
logical absurdity.  This is why, in his 1971 Foreign Affairs essay, Earl Ravenal wrote that a “One 
China and One Taiwan” policy “implies that Taiwan must relinquish the Offshore Islands since 
they are not part of the province.”87   
  None of the points above, however, are meant to suggest that it would be impossible for 
Taiwan to rewrite its congruent sovereignty claims.  The scholar George G. Wilson points out 
that "title to domain may be acquired by prescription through uninterrupted and uncontested 
possession going beyond memory."88  This perspective presents its own challenges, however, 
since Taiwan’s possession is neither uncontested nor uninterrupted.  Possession may be nine-
tenths of the law, but the missing tenth is the legal part.  Russia’s sixty-year-long occupation of 
the Kuril Islands has not won international legal opinion over to its cause, nor has China’s 
ongoing land-reclamation/island-building (填海造岛, tian hai zao dao) activities and its nearly 
exclusive history of occupation in the South China Sea succeeded in settling related legal 
disputes in its favor. 
 For the “kingdom islands” of Quemoy and Matsu, the Taiwan government could invoke 
the principle of self-determination, established in the UN Charter and Resolutions 1514 and 
1541.  As will become evident in a later section of this paper, there is ample reason to believe 
that the citizens of Quemoy and Matsu would choose to remain part of Taiwan if given the 
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opportunity.  However, in practice, international support for self-determination has been patchy 
and unpredictable.  Article 6 of Resolution 1514 states: 
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.89 
 
International law scholars like Michael Gunther, Allen Buchanan, and A. Rigo Sureda have all 
written extensively about the resulting tension between territorial integrity and self-
determination, and the historically uneven application of the principles outlined in the Charter 
and subsequent declarations.90  Consider the cases of the Falkland Islands, Western Sahara, 
South Ossetia, or Crimea,91 to name just a few.  Sureda further demonstrates that colonial 
enclaves—e.g., Ifni, Goa and Gibraltar—have likewise been denied the right to self-
determination.92  To this list could be added Macau and Hong Kong.  James Crawford elaborates, 
“colonial enclaves constitute in effect an exception to the self-determination rule, and that the 
only option is for the administering authority to transfer the enclave to the enclaving State. The 
wishes of the enclave are not regarded as relevant.”93  Relevant to whom?  To the court of 
international legal opinion, embodied in the UN system.  In the case of Taiwan’s offshore 
islands, China can certainly articulate a stronger argument for territorial integrity and national 
unity, and Quemoy and Matsu are certainly enclaves, if not colonial ones.  This does not mean it 
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would be impossible for Taiwan to win over international support for self-determination on the 
offshores, but history suggests it would an uphill battle. 
 Regardless of which rationale, or combination of rationales, Taiwan might adopt to revise 
its post-independence congruent claims to Quemoy, Matsu, Itu Aba, and Pratas, the transition 
period that follows as the world adjusts to Taiwan’s new logic will provide a strategic 
opportunity for China to strike. 
 
IV.2. A Horse of a Different Color: Taiwan’s Opposing Sovereignty Claim 
 
 The concept of congruity is equally applicable to Taiwan’s claims over the Pescadores, 
insofar as the Taiwan authorities’ assertions of universal Chinese sovereignty do not exclude 
them, but there are several unique aspects of Taiwan’s connection with the islands which seem to 
bestow a modern and legal character to its opposing claim over them, even though the Taiwan 
authorities have never officially articulated it.94  As a result, the Pescadores do indeed appear to 
be a horse of a different color, which makes assertions about the inevitability of their 
retrocession particularly controversial.  The foundations underlying the special nature of the 
Pescadores is twofold, including both historical and documentary components.    
 There are at least two features of the Pescadores’ history which sets them apart from the 
rest of The Five Islands.  First, from the fall of Tungning (the Koxinga Dynasty) in 1683 until 
1887, when the protracted Sino-French war weakly dissolved into a dubious Chinese victory, 
Taiwan and the Pescadores had been administered as Qing prefectures of Fujian Province.95  
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During this period, it was the Pescadores, not Taiwan, which the Qing deemed strategically 
important.  As one official wrote to the emperor in the late 17th Century: 
“Taiwan is nothing but an isolated island on the sea far away from China, it has long 
since been a hideout of pirates, escaped convicts, deserters and ruffians, therefore, there 
is nothing to gain from retaining it.  On the other hand, the [Pescadores], being an 
important military strongpoint, need to be retained and used as a front base in the eastern 
China Sea.”96 
 
In 1887, however, the victorious Chinese general, Liu Mingchuan, became the first governor of a 
semi-autonomous Taiwan Province, which also exercised jurisdiction over the Pescadores.97  It 
could be argued, therefore, that the Qing emperor himself considered the Pescadores to be a 
complementary part of Taiwan. 
 Second, the Japanese appeared to accept the Qing interpretation of complementarity in 
1895 when they demanded the simultaneous annexation of both the Pescadores and Taiwan in 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  Thereafter, both islands were subjected to Japanese colonial rule 
until the Japanese surrender in 1945.  There is a case to be made, therefore, that the Pescadores 
and Taiwan were drawn closer together—and thus further from the Mainland—by their shared 
experience during the first half of the 20th Century.   
 While these two historical phenomena present an undeniable logic, it is far from 
compelling because it relies on a temporary arrangement externally imposed by a corrupt and 
imminently defunct regime in the first case, and on a speculative psycho-emotional solidarity 
resulting from foreign aggression and occupation in the second case.  Furthermore, there is a 
certain degree of intellectual risk in founding sovereignty claims on the historical policies of a 
rival’s predecessor.  After all, the PRC holds China’s seat in the UN, and is therefore 
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internationally recognized as the legitimate successor of the Qing.  In other words, China giveth 
and China taketh away.   
 The documentary component of Taiwan’s opposing claims over the Pescadores is slightly 
more authoritative.   In several legal and binding documents since 1895, Taiwan and the 
Pescadores exhibit a consistent and close association which indicates a definite prejudice among 
the signatories.   
 The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki dictated the following conditions in Article 2: 
“China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, 
together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon: 
    (b) The island of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all islands appertaining or 
belonging to the said island of Formosa. 
(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th 
degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north 
latitude.”98   
 
 The 1943 Cairo Declaration professed the following intention of the “Three Great 
Allies”: 
“It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she 
has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all 
the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], 
and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” 
 
 In Chapter II, Article 2b of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, “Japan renounces all right, 
title and claim to Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores.”99   
 Article 2 of the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty reiterated that “Japan has renounced all 
right, title, and claim to Taiwan and the Pescadores as well as the Spratly Islands and the 
Paracel Islands.”100  Parenthetically, some scholars have emphasized that “renouncing” is not 
equivalent to “returning,” and that this treaty does not necessarily cede Taiwan and the 
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Pescadores back to China, strengthening the case for an opposing claim.  As late as 1955, Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden concluded that “"Formosa and the Pescadores are . . . in the view of Her 
Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty of which is uncertain or 
undetermined."101  
 In Article 6 of the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty (MDF), the U.S. strictly 
defined the territorial parameters of its commitment: 
“For the purposes of Articles 2 and 5, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall 
mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores.”102 
 
 Lastly, Section 15, paragraph 2 of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) similarly 
defines Taiwan’s territory: 
“The term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the 
Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations 
created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing 
authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to 
January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political 
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).”103 
 
Of all of the documents, the TRA establishes the most direct link between Taiwan and the 
Pescadores by using them both to jointly define the word “Taiwan.”  There is an explicit 
assumption, therefore, that the Pescadores are an integral part of Taiwan.   
 These official texts suggest a special relationship between Taiwan and the Pescadores 
which has only gathered strength with the passage of time.  However, a close analysis of the 
language in all cases discerns a distinct separation between the two islands.  For example, in the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, Article 2b cedes Taiwan, including all islands belonging to it.  If the 
Pescadores “belonged” to Taiwan, why was it necessary to cede them separately in Article 2c?  
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The Cairo Conference, to which Chiang Kai-Shek himself was a party, lists the Pescadores in a 
three-part series, “such as Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores.”104  Typically, series should 
be formed of qualitatively equal parts.  If the drafters of the Cairo Declaration believed that the 
Pescadores were a subordinate part of Taiwan, this phrasing is semantically equivalent to, “such 
as California, Colorado, and Denver.”  Similarly, the remaining four documents cited above, 
including the TRA, all explicitly reference Taiwan and the Pescadores, but make no mention of 
Taiwan’s other islands, such as Green Island or Orchid Island.  If it is already understood that the 
Pescadores are an integral part of Taiwan, why is it necessary to enumerate them separately?105  
The histories recounted thus far in this paper should suffice to answer that question.  Even if 
there is a gradually developing awareness of Taiwan’s opposing sovereignty over the 
Pescadores, the fact remains that for most of China and Taiwan’s history, they were not regarded 
as part of Taiwan.   
 
V. From Cutting to Binding: Evolutions in The Five Islands’ Strategic Value 
 
 The PLA has come a long way since its ignominious defeat at the Battle of Guningtou in 
1949.  In its 2016 annual report to Congress on Chinese military development, the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) made the following assessment: 
“With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an 
invasion of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. 
A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is 
within China’s capabilities.”106 
 
                                                          
104 Emphasis added. 
105 Consider the equivalent implication in the following analogy: “The Jones’ family is cordially invited to the 
community Christmas party.  Mr. Jones is also invited.”     
106 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2016,” https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf 
40 
 
If the PLA has the capacity to invade the islands, what is China waiting for?   
 It was already revealed in Section III of this paper that Quemoy operates at a ¥2 billion 
annual budget deficit, which falls on the shoulders of the “national” government.  Together, 
Quemoy and Matsu have represented Taiwan’s most immediate military vulnerability for over 
sixty years, and have been the sole battleground for cross-strait air and surface warfare since 
1955.  Yet, despite the PLA’s rapidly improving capabilities, Taiwan continues to downgrade the 
islands’ physical defenses.  Coastal pillboxes and firing positions are empty, dilapidated and 
open to the public, as are Quemoy’s extensive network of subterranean tunnels.  The Taiwan 
Ministry of Defense has incrementally opened many of Quemoy’s and Matsu’s previously secret 
or restricted military zones in order to improve the tourism market on the islands.107  
Consequently, Mainland Chinese tourists can be seen everywhere, snapping selfies in front of 
derelict fortifications, rusted hunks of decommissioned armored vehicles, or pristine beaches 
littered with corroding, anti-amphibious landing obstacles.108  Is Taiwan no longer worried about 
the prospect of a Mainland military assault on the islands?  If so, why not?  For that matter, why 
does Taiwan even bother garrisoning troops on the islands or propping up the lackluster local 
economies?  The previous section demonstrated that Taiwan’s sovereignty claims over the 
islands are tenuous at best.  Why then does Taiwan insist on retaining them?  Why was the U.S. 
willing to entertain the possibility of war with China just to defend “those damn little offshore 
islands?”   
 This section examines the question of The Five Islands’ strategic value, from both PRC 
and Taiwan perspectives.109  It finds it useful to divide the islands into two categories: 1) front 
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line islands (Quemoy, Matsu and the Pescadores), and 2) sideline islands (Itu Aba and Pratas.)  
This grouping corresponds exactly to the islands’ classification as castle or kingdom islands, but 
this is quite by accident.  The front line islands—especially Quemoy and Matsu—have 
performed a unique role in shaping cross-strait relations, and their strategic value has evolved in 
three distinct phases, to be discussed at length below.  This role is largely immaterial to their 
dual status as kingdom islands, except insofar as their populations have constructed a sort of 
“cultural bridge” between the Mainland and Taiwan during the third phase.  The sideline islands, 
as the name suggests, were too distant to play any part in this unfolding drama.  Their value too 
has mutated slightly over the last few decades, but along an entirely different vector.  Therefore, 
the following subsections will deal with the front line islands and sideline islands separately, and 
in turn.   
 
V.1. Front Line Islands 
 
V.1.A. Offensive Lodgments and Defensive Bulwarks 
 
“[Quemoy] is in Xiamen harbor, and it is like holding Manhattan against the United 
States Army.”110 
 
 In 2016, a U.S. military liaison in Taipei described the offshore islands as “tactically 
worthless.”111  He was not alone in this view.  Admiral Yarnell’s dim appraisal of the islands has 
already been noted.  “General J. Lawton Collins and Admiral Raymond A. Spruance both 
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deemed Matsu and Quemoy to be strategically valueless,”112 and Don Kash wrote in 1963 that 
“military men are in almost universal agreement that Quemoy and Matsu, like the Tachen 
[Dachen] Islands which were evacuated early in 1955, have little or no military value for the 
defense of Taiwan.”113  Kash also argued that resources spent securing the offshores would be 
put to better use defending Taiwan and the Pescadores.  The reader will recall that as much as 
1/3 of Taiwan’s military strength was concentrated on Quemoy in 1962.  Had the PRC the will 
and capacity to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan during that time, Chiang would have made 
the PLA’s job that much easier by taking so many of his troops out of the fight.   
 Of course, Chiang Kai-Shek staunchly disagreed.  He obstinately maintained that 
Quemoy and Matsu were not only critically important to Taiwan’s air-defense architecture, but 
were also crucial for establishing lodgments near the Mainland coastline in support of future 
offensive operations.114  Regardless of how specious such tactical justifications might have been, 
there is no question that Taiwan’s military forces on Quemoy, Matsu, and even the Pescadores, 
pose a clear and present danger to the coastal areas of Fujian.  Xiamen is well within the range of 
conventional artillery located on Quemoy,115 and a vehicle-mounted multiple launch rocket 
system (MLRS) would place Fuzhou within striking distance for units on Matsu.  Taiwan’s 
limited arsenal of HF-2E and HF-3 land attack cruise missiles (LACM) would normally have 
trouble ranging targets on the Mainland, but their deployment on the front line islands could 
extend their maximum effective range by 50-150 kilometers.116   
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 The preponderance of evidence now suggests that Mao never intended to take Quemoy or 
Matsu during the 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait Crises, nor during the 1962 Invasion Scare.117  This 
certainly was not the case on October 25, 1949, however, when over 9,000 PLA troops aboard 
300 or more fishing craft amphibiously assaulted Quemoy under cover of darkness.  They met 
with catastrophic defeat at the hands of a 20,000 strong Nationalist force, who were dug in and 
waiting for them; the entire invasion force was either killed or captured.  The win was a much 
needed salve for the bruised egos and crippled morale of Chiang and his Nationalists.118  They 
had won few battles in the preceding months, and this unqualified victory on Quemoy may at 
least partially explain Chiang’s intractable position on the island.  In 1955, he ignored American 
pleas to abandon the offshores, even after Eisenhower and Dulles withdrew their “secret pledge” 
to defend them, and tried to entice him with the promise of a 500 mile naval blockade of the 
Chinese coastline and the deployment of nuclear weapons on Taiwan.119 
 Even if American tacticians scoffed at the offshores’ feasibility as offensive lodgments— 
“As Chiang's command staff on Quemoy admits, establishing a beachhead or even landing a 
small party on the rugged, well-defended Fukien coast would be next to impossible.”120—Mao 
should be forgiven for his caution.  After all, the U.S. decided to “de-neutralize” the Taiwan 
Strait and “unleash” Chiang in February 1953, one month after Chiang himself announced that 
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1953 would be the “last year of preparation for the counter offensive.”121  The Communists were 
accustomed to such rhetoric, but the Nationalists subsequently undertook a massive buildup of 
forces on Quemoy and Matsu, augmented by “hundreds of landing craft…with American 
engines.”122  The futility of a Nationalist invasion appears less assured when supported by U.S. 
naval artillery, air support, and tactical nuclear strikes against Mainland fuel dumps and airfields; 
none of these options were ever completely off the table.123  If securing a beachhead on the 
Fujian coastline was “all but impossible,” why did the PRC amass so many forces there in 1962, 
generating a military signature large enough to prompt U.S. concerns about an imminent 
Communist invasion of Taiwan?124  In 1962, China was “down and out” after the disastrous 
failures of the Great Leap Forward.  Mao and his staff clearly believed that a Nationalist invasion 
was not beyond the realm of possibility.   
 Aside from their implausible tactical value as bulwarks for the defense of Taiwan or as 
lodgments for major offensive operations on the Mainland, there is no denying that Quemoy and 
Matsu served as bases for an unremitting harassment campaign against Communist positions and 
shipping along the Fujian coast throughout the 1950s.  Due to their proximity to Xiamen and 
Fuzhou, respectively, they were ideal platforms for frequent Nationalist air raids and commando 
infiltrations,125 and for the enforcement of an effective naval and artillery blockade of both 
harbors.126 These activities must have been a considerable source of annoyance for the CCP, and 
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at least partially motivated the inexorable succession of offshore island seizures in 1950-1955, 
already noted earlier in this paper. 
 This section has assessed the tactical value of the front line islands, particularly Quemoy 
and Matsu, but it has not adequately answered the question: Why these islands?  What makes 
Quemoy, Matsu and the Pescadores more tactically valuable than Dengbu, Pishan, Yushan, 
Zhoushan, Dachen, Nanchi, Hainan or any other of the offshore islands Chiang surrendered after 
1949?  As for the Pescadores, the answer is fairly straightforward: They widened operational 
windows for combat aircraft and extend the effective ranges of LACMs by decreasing the 
distance between Taiwan and the Mainland, while still remaining safely out of reach for much of 
the PLA’s combat power.    For Quemoy and Matsu, however, the question is harder to answer.  
Certainly, Xiamen and Fuzhou are both important Chinese ports, but were they more important 
than Shanghai, which the Nationalists were able to cover from the Dachens?127  Miles Yu 
contends that Xiamen is the most likely port of embarkation for a seaborne invasion of 
Taiwan.128  Fuzhou, arguably, is a close second.  This explanation is eminently reasonable, and is 
supported by the historical record.129  Quemoy’s and Matsu’s association with the Koxinga myth 
and the Mazu cult,130 respectively, offer additional explanations.  Furthermore, the Nationalists 
may have become psychologically invested in Quemoy after their overwhelming victory in the 
Battle of Guningtou.  It is also possible that neither Quemoy nor Matsu had any greater tactical 
value than the other islands, but were simply the last two remaining Nationalist outposts in the 
                                                          
127 Ibid. 
128 Yu, “The Battle of Quemoy,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2016, 92 
129 Recall that Lin Taochen, Koxinga, and Shi Lang all sailed eastward to the Pescadores and Taiwan from Xiamen. 
130 For more information on the Mazu cult, see Sangren, P. Steven. "History and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy: The Ma 
Tsu Cult of Taiwan." Comparative Studies in Society and History 30, no. 4 (1988): 674-97.  According to legend, 
Mazipo, the devoted daughter of a Fuzhou fisherman, once used her spiritual powers to save her parents from a 
violent storm and was later apotheosized and worshiped as a Chinese goddess.  Today, Matsu is still an important 
pilgrimage destination for her followers on Taiwan and the Mainland.   
46 
 
offshore area.  Freed from commitments on the other islands, Chiang may have felt more 
confident in his ability to retain them.   
 
V.1.B. Keeping it in the Ring: China’s DMZ 
 
 The PLA’s defeat at Guningtou exposed severe shortcomings in its naval and amphibious 
capabilities, but their subsequent victories at Hainan, the Zhoushans and Dachens all 
demonstrated marked improvements.  Why then did the PLA never venture a second assault on 
Quemoy?  For that matter, why have they never attempted to seize Matsu?  If we are to believe 
the bulk of official and expert opinion, the mutual bombardments and dogfights of the 1st and 2nd 
Taiwan Strait Crises should not be interpreted as preludes to invasion.  A senior policy planner 
with the U.S. State Department serving in Taiwan during the 1st Strait Crisis recalled that “our 
judgments were that they, in fact, did not intend to seize the island [Quemoy].”131  Chinese 
officials have similarly maintained that the PLA only ever intended to seize the Dachens in the 
early months of 1955; declassified CIA reports corroborate this claim.132  This still does not 
answer the central question: Why not?  Why seize one, but decline to move against the other?     
 The PLA learned in 1949 that Quemoy is a hard target; its defensive capacity improved 
steadily through the 50s and 60s.  As Ravenal observed in 1971: 
“[Quemoy] presents the prospect of a bloodbath for an attacking communist force. The 
nationalists have 65,000 troops on Quemoy and Little Quemoy and have spent the 17 
years since the communist bombardment of 1954-55 digging in to indestructible 
positions, with landing areas thickly protected and armored forces in reserve to defeat 
attempts to establish a beachhead.”133   
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Quemoy’s supposed impregnability does not apply to the loosely scattered islands of Matsu, 
however, which currently have only one third as many ROC forces (5,000)134 as the U.S. helped 
evacuate from the Dachens (15,000) in 1955.135 
 There was no small threat of U.S. intervention during the 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait Crisis; 
indeed, that threat undoubtedly remains a key variable in the PRC’s strategic calculations vis-à-
vis Taiwan to the present day.  Mao reportedly wanted to avoid U.S. combat involvement in the 
offshores, which is why he forbade his commanders to attack the Dachens if U.S. forces were 
present.136  If that was true, however, the PLA’s intelligence was woefully incomplete.  In fact, 
there were U.S. forces in the vicinity of the Dachens when Mao attacked Yijiangshan in January 
1955, and they remained long enough cover the Nationalists’ evacuation.  What is more, eight 
U.S. servicemen were among the 1,000 Nationalist ground forces on Yijiangshan when PLA 
amphibious forces overwhelmed the defenders on January 18, 1955.137  Likewise, the presence of 
U.S. forces on Quemoy and Matsu had not prevented the Communists from shelling both islands 
in September 1954, killing two U.S. servicemembers.138  Furthermore, if Mao truly believed that 
the Dachens posed a greater threat to Mainland security than either Quemoy or Matsu, as some 
scholars suggest, then he would not have failed to assume that the U.S. and Chiang agreed.139  If 
his greatest concern was to prevent U.S. intervention in the conflict, it makes little sense to attack 
the most strategically important target first.  It would have been far safer to assault an island of 
lesser value, and then gauge the U.S. response before escalating the situation.  The truth is that 
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Mao was already playing an extremely dangerous game, and while he no doubt was gravely 
concerned with U.S. policy and potential U.S. reactions to his provocations, the fear of 
intervention alone is not sufficient to explain his restraint regarding Quemoy and Matsu. 
  A consensus was already developing among scholars, officials and experts in the 1950s 
that Mao was reluctant to take Quemoy and Matsu for the same reason that Chiang was so 
determined to keep them.  Both leaders were worried about the consequences if the Nationalists 
disengaged from the offshores and withdrew completely across the Taiwan Strait.   
“Politically, if there had been a severance of the offshore islands from Taiwan, it would 
probably have intensified the probability of a political separation of Taiwan from the 
mainland.  What the islands represented was the link of China with Taiwan.”140   
 
American journalist Anna Louise Strong wrote the following in a Moscow-based news 
publication in 1958: 
"It is clear to anyone in China that Peking could have taken Tsinmentao [Quemoy] by 
warfare or got it by bargaining with Dulles.  To take Tsinmentao at present, without 
taking Taiwan, would isolate Taiwan and thus assist Dulles in his policy of building 'two 
Chinas."'141 
 
Neither side wanted an American trusteeship on Taiwan; nor were they eager to defenestrate 
their plans for reunification.  Former U.S. diplomat and sinologist George Kerr drove the point 
home in his imperishable and controversial memoir, Formosa Betrayed: 
“If the Communists succeeded in taking Quemoy they would be faced with the need to 
make good promises to take Formosa as well and that endeavor would certainly mean 
the quick destruction of Chinese cities and industrial concentrations everywhere in 
China.”142 
 
 The PLA had been so successful in forcing the Nationalists off of their numerous 
“outposts” along the Chinese coast that they had very nearly driven them entirely out of reach 
forever.  Before June 1950, several U.S. officials believed that a Communist invasion of Taiwan 
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was not only imminent, but almost guaranteed to succeed,143 such was the wretched state of 
Nationalist morale and the hostile political environment of Taiwan, where the Nationalists were 
resented every bit as much as the Japanese.  After Kim Il-Sung and his army poured across the 
38th parallel on June 25, 1950, however, Truman moved the 7th Fleet into the Strait, and forced 
China to postpone the liberation of Taiwan indefinitely.  With the U.S. joining the fray, China 
would require an advanced navy and air force if it hoped to stage a successful invasion of 
Taiwan.144 In 1950, the CCP had nothing of the sort, and one U.S. analyst estimated that a 
“single American aircraft carrier accompanied by a modest cruiser and destroyer force would 
have been adequate to crush any invasion attempt.”145   
 Mao needed a way to impose measurable and highly visible military costs on the 
Nationalists, which he could then feed to the Chinese public through the state-controlled media 
and thus keep them mentally focused and emotionally invested in the ultimate liberation of 
Taiwan.  Quemoy and Matsu provided the perfect setting for these “information operations.”  
Chiang required a similar vehicle for elevating the state of readiness domestically, and for 
drumming up support internationally.  It would have been politically awkward for U.S. leaders to 
downgrade military support for Taiwan while Nationalist forces were actively engaged on the 
offshores.  Whenever PLA artillery pummeled Quemoy and Matsu from 1954-1979, Nationalist 
troops would later emerge from their bunkers to “count shells.”  The Taiwan media would then 
frantically wire the final tallies to press offices all over the world for global dissemination.146  
Foreign delegations to Taipei were often hurried over to Quemoy and Matsu for the grand tour of 
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their impressive fortifications, or to experience the thrill of a Communist barrage, giving rise to 
derisive appellations for the offshores like “Chiang’s Quemoy-Matsu National Park.”147 
 The CCP and KMT labored jointly, therefore, to transform the front line islands into a 
Chinese version of the Korean Peninsula’s DMZ.  Quemoy and Matsu became a faux 
battleground and quasi-diplomatic forum, where both sides could engage in aggressive behavior 
completely divorced from actual intentions of war.  Military confrontations substituted for 
diplomatic engagement, which was nonexistent.  For example, it is widely acknowledged now 
that Mao started shelling Quemoy and Matsu in September 1954, precipitating the 1st Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, in order to prevent the U.S. from signing a mutual defense treaty (MDF) with 
Taiwan.148  Mao could not have failed to notice that the U.S. had balked at signing a MDF with 
South Korea until after the armistice, and he decided to test the hypothesis on the offshores.149  
In addition, from 1958-1979, the Communists and Nationalists exchanged artillery fire—
typically propaganda rounds—on alternate days; that is, the CCP would fire on Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays, while the KMT fired on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, with an 
inexplicable truce every Sunday.150  This absurd ritual continued unfailingly until January 1, 
1979, when the U.S. normalized relations with the PRC, whereupon the cannons abruptly went 
silent. 151  Clearly, the “Odd Days War,” as the phenomenon came to be known, had been little 
more than a diplomatic signal to the U.S.  A final example of this “crisis diplomacy” occurred on 
June 18, 1960, when PLA cannons rocked Quemoy with a record-breaking 86,000 rounds to 
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protest Eisenhower’s visit to Taipei.  The PRC punctuated its displeasure with a valedictory 
stonk on the following day, just as Eisenhower was boarding his plane for departure.152 
 
V.1.C. A Toe in the Water: The Three Mini-Links 
 
 On October 2, 2000, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council153 published the results of its 
impact study for a proposed “Three Mini-Links” (TML) policy which would effectively end a 50 
year ban on direct trade, travel and communication between the two sides of the strait.  The PRC 
should have been elated and highly receptive to the proposal.  After all, they had been 
promulgating their own “Three Direct Links” (TDL) concept since December 1979, when the 
People’s Congress called for “starting postal and air and shipping services across the Straits as 
soon as possible," and "developing trade, supplying each other's needs, and conducting economic 
exchanges.”154  There was a catch, however.  Taiwan’s TML would only involve the trial 
resumption of direct links between the front line islands and cities on the Fujian coastline.  
Furthermore, the policy would chiefly apply only to Quemoy and Matsu; the Pescadores would 
only establish links on a case-by-case basis.  The MAC study stated that the “aim of the exercise 
is [to] strengthen and stimulate economic growth and development of these off-shore islands.”155 
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 The PRC was not particularly pleased, but grudgingly agreed to play along.  In an official 
press statement, Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesman Zhang Mingqing objected that “these 
are not the three direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services across the straits, known 
as the ‘three direct links,’ in a genuine sense and could not meet the demands of cross-straits 
exchange.”  He added, however, "We are willing to support the so-called three 'mini links', but 
we still hope the Taiwan authorities would give a go-ahead for the 'three direct links' across the 
straits as early as possible."156  Taiwan unilaterally implemented the TML on January 1, 2001, 
and commercial cross-strait activity grew steadily year on year despite the “diplomatic freeze” 
during Chen Shuibian’s presidency (2000-2008).  This was especially true for transportation.  
For example, the total number of individual trips between Taiwan and the Mainland through the 
TML increased from a mere 25,469 in 2001 to 1,041,386 in 2008.157  During Ma Ying-Jeou’s 
presidency (2008-2016), the TML made meaningful progress toward a true TDL.  The 
Pescadores were nearly fully integrated into the TML framework in mid-2007,158 and direct 
flights from Taiwan to the Mainland started in 2008.159 
 The benefits of the TML for the tourist economies of the front line islands were already 
highlighted in Section III of this paper.  On balance, the effects of the islands’ “special 
relationship” with the Mainland have been overwhelmingly positive.  Li Woshi, a Kinmen 
County magistrate, likely spoke for all of the front line islands when he said that the “outlying 
island[s] should not be seen just as a hub for travel between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, 
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but also as a testing ground for other policies.”160  The current section of this paper deals with the 
evolving strategic value of the front line islands.  The TML, therefore, illustrates a modern, non-
military function for the islands, which nevertheless remain a type of test bed and proving 
ground for cross-strait policy and power plays.  More importantly, the TML constitutes yet 
another tacit admission that these three islands are politically distinct from Taiwan.  In support of 
this point, consider that multiple-entry landing visas issued to Mainlanders visiting the front line 
islands are not valid for entry to the main island of Taiwan.161  The Taiwan authorities’ 
willingness to expose the islands to exploratory risk, as a person dips a toe into uncertain waters, 
implies that they are “something else” altogether, or at least that they are expendable.  
 
V.2. Riding the Bench: Sideline Islands 
 
“Taiwan is not much concerned about an invasion of Taiping Island by the PRC…unless 
there is a serious deterioration in cross-strait relations, Beijing could hardly justify taking 
military action against Taiping.”162 
 
 
 Although Taiwan military garrisons have occupied Pratas and Itu Aba since 1946 and 
1956, respectively, the tyranny of distance effectively removed them from the grand spectacle of 
the 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait Crises.  After 1970, however, as Quemoy and Matsu bowed off the 
stage, the islands of the South China Sea (SCS) emerged on the scene and drew world attention.  
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The PLA Navy (PLAN) had not been active in the SCS before January 1974, when it clashed 
with Vietnamese vessels in the vicinity of the Paracels.  A similar naval skirmish occurred in 
1988 near Johnson Reef, in the Spratly Formation.163  Later, in 2012, a standoff between the 
PLAN and a Philippine warship grabbed international headlines.164  Since 2013, the PRC’s 
aggressive land reclamation and island-building (填海造岛, tian hai zao dao) activities have 
redefined the SCS as a focal point for global media, security professionals, and academics alike.  
To the present date, however, the PRC has never directly threatened Itu Aba or Pratas, nor have 
they scuffled with Taiwan naval ships in the SCS—although there is a history of PRC 
interdiction, boarding and inspection of Taiwan fishing vessels.165  In fact, their joint occupation 
of islands in the SCS is an area of common ground, neatly circumscribed by the enigmatic U-
shaped line.  The increasing usage of the term, “U-shaped line” (‘U’型线, ‘U’xing xian), as 
opposed to other formulations like the 9-dash line, 10-dash line, or 11-dash line (九/十/十一段
线, jiu/shi/shi yi duan xian), highlights the congruity of the PRC’s and Taiwan’s claims.  One 
could almost say that the shape traces a “smile” on cross-strait relations. 
 For the PRC, Itu Aba and Pratas are strategically valuable because Taiwan claims and 
defends them.   There can be little doubt that China would quickly occupy them if Taiwan 
withdrew, lest it face the prospect of forcibly removing another country’s military, e.g. the 
Philippines or Vietnam.  The islands also have intrinsic value due to their size and advanced 
infrastructure, along with their advantageous position, which enlarges an occupier’s territorial 
waters—and potential EEZ, if the PCA award is ever appealed or overturned.  In addition, this 
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paper argues that China would move against the islands if Taiwan achieved de jure 
independence.  Until that happens, however, Taiwan’s presence on the islands inestimably 
strengthens Beijing’s own position in the SCS, for several reasons. 
 First, Taiwan has helped the PRC downgrade Itu Aba and Pratas to an “economy of 
force” mission; that is, Taiwan spends energy and resources developing and defending the 
islands, so China is free to focus their efforts elsewhere.166  Taiwan’s stewardship of the islands 
ensures that they will not fall into the hands of another regional power.  Meanwhile, all of 
China’s rival claimants in the SCS maintain a “One China” policy, meaning that they legally 
view Taiwan as a political extension of Beijing in the SCS.  This is at least one of the reasons 
why Taiwan was denied permission to participate in the PCA proceedings or even to send a 
delegation to observe them.167  When the PCA announced its award on July 12, 2016, therefore, 
Taiwan predictably—and in chorus with Beijing—denounced the ruling, since they were a party 
to neither the arbitration nor the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).168  Months before the ruling, the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had 
preemptively rejected the outcome of the arbitration in an official statement: 
“The Philippines has not invited the ROC to participate in its arbitration with mainland 
China, and the arbitral tribunal has not solicited the ROC’s views. Therefore, the 
arbitration does not affect the ROC in any way, and the ROC neither recognizes nor 
accepts related awards.”169 
 
Taiwan had offered unsolicited views, however, when they submitted evidence supporting Itu 
Aba’s status as an island, as opposed to a rock, reef, or “high tide feature.”  The Philippines 
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encouraged the tribunal to allow the submission because China had declined to appear for the 
proceedings,170 although the court persisted in referring to Taiwan as “The Taiwan Authority of 
China,” underscoring the congruity of China’s and Taiwan’s claims.  In this instance too, 
therefore, Itu Aba became an economy of force operation; China did not have to defend Itu Aba 
in the arbitration because Taiwan did it for them. 
 Second, Itu Aba and Pratas provide fertile soil for cross-strait cooperation.  PRC Foreign 
Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Yingchun offered the following answer to a question about the 
MOFA statement cited above: 
“I want to stress that Chinese people from both sides of the Straits have the responsibility 
and obligation to jointly uphold territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests 
of the country.”171 
 
During the 1988 confrontation between China and Vietnam in the Spratlys, Taiwan defense 
minister Cheng Weiyuan indicated that Taiwan was willing to help the PRC defend the Spratlys 
against a third-party, if asked.172  Then in 1993, another defense minister said the nature of cross-
strait relations "does not preclude and does not eliminate the possibility of exchanging views on 
these issues [peaceful development and administration of the archipelago] with the Chinese 
mainland."173  In 1995, despite the political imbroglio Lee Teng-Hui caused by visiting his alma 
mater in the U.S., two oil magnates—one PRC and the other Taiwan—nevertheless reached a 
preliminary agreement for joint oil exploration in the vicinity of Pratas.174   
 Third, Taiwan’s involvement in the SCS “muddies” the waters for other claimants, as 
well as for interested bystanders like the U.S.  As one PRC scholar put it: “Should mainland 
                                                          
170 Permanent Court of Arbitration. “PCA Case Nº 2013-19,” July 12, 2016, 31-32 
171 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on November 2, 2015,” PRC Foreign 
Ministry, accessed April 18, 2017, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1311236.shtml 
172 Lin, "Taiwan's South China Sea Policy," Asian Survey (1997): 332 
173 Sun Chen, quoted in Ibid., 333 
174 Ibid., 333 
57 
 
China and Taiwan stand shoulder-to-shoulder in the negotiation process, they will make a 
stronger case vis-à-vis other claimants.”  The PRC and Taiwan reinforce each other’s claims 
because they are founded on the same historical and documentary evidence.  For the 
international audience, this reality indirectly endorses China’s claim alone, since all but 22 
countries acknowledge the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China.  It also makes it 
substantially harder for unilateral or multilateral efforts to curb China’s activities in the SCS, 
since Taiwan is basically complicit in China’s maritime territorial ambitions; in fact, Taiwan’s 
ambitions in the SCS are even broader.  After all, their “line” has two more dashes.  How 
mortifying would it be for the U.S. to find itself thrust into a military standoff with the PRC and 
Taiwan?     
 For Taiwan, the PRC’s strategic interests in the sideline islands mirror several of their 
own.  China’s congruent sovereignty claims over Itu Aba and Pratas tend to strengthen Taiwan’s 
own position.  Likewise, China’s military presence in the SCS mitigates Taiwan’s vulnerability 
to regional security threats, although it is unclear what price Taiwan would have to pay for 
Chinese intervention.  Of course, the PLAN also poses a direct, existential threat to Taiwan’s 
control of Itu Aba and Pratas, but the point being made here is that Taiwan could possibly count 
on Chinese support if the Philippines, for instance, attacked one of the islands.  Furthermore, 
cross-strait relations absolutely stand to benefit from the types of bilateral cooperation cited in 
the paragraph above.  In short, these interests exhibit reciprocal strategic effects. 
 However, Taiwan has at least two strategic interests in these islands which are not shared 
by the PRC.  First, since the KMT’s defeat in 1949, Taiwan has experienced a steady and 
humiliating contraction of its maneuver space in two key areas: 1) geographically, from 1949-
1955, when the CCP seized most of its few remaining offshore holdings; and 2) politically, since 
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1971, when it lost its seat in the UN and began slowly hemorrhaging diplomatic partners.  
Therefore, retaining control of the sideline islands is partly about protecting Taiwan’s fragile 
“national” pride and prestige.  So far from Taiwan, and nearer in fact to some other of the SCS 
littoral states, Itu Aba and Pratas are precarious toeholds propping up Taiwan’s failing grip on 
regional power.  This explains the vitriolic outpouring of public opinion whenever foreign 
entities weigh in on the islands’ legal status or express disapproval of Taiwan’s activities upon 
them.  When the U.S. Department of State demarched Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration after the 
lame duck president visited Itu Aba in January 2016, the Taiwan public lashed back by taking to 
the street and demonstrating loudly in front of the Taipei main office of the American Institute in 
Taiwan (AIT).175 
 Second, Ma Ying-Jeou introduced the use of the sideline islands, especially Itu Aba, as a 
vehicle for enlarging Taiwan’s international space.  Taiwan is uniformly barred from 
participation in multilateral organizations requiring nation-state status.  Even within those 
organizations it is occasionally allowed to join, e.g. the Olympics, World Health Assembly, 
World Trade Organization, International Civil Aviation Association, etc., it is often limited to 
attending as an “observer” and is always required to modify its name in some way, i.e. “Chinese 
Taipei,” “The Separate Customs Area of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Matsu,” etc.  During his 
2016 visit to Itu Aba, President Ma delivered a speech in which he designated the island as a 
“starting point” for his 2015 South China Sea Peace Initiative, whose aim was to “reduce 
tensions, increase dialogue, abide by international law, uphold the freedom of navigation and 
overflight, maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, and settle disputes peacefully.”  
He also outlined plans to transform Itu Aba into base for multilateral security cooperation and 
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real-world “peace” operations, as well as a center for scientific research.  Ma was careful to point 
out that while the PRC has continued to militarize the region, Taiwan effectively did the opposite 
when they replaced the ROC Marine garrison with the ROC Coastguard in 2000.176  If President 
Tsai Ing-Wen were somehow willing or able to successfully implement some version of Ma’s 
initiative, it would certainly win Taiwan an important seat at the table.  However, it is far less 
certain whether China would be willing to cooperate.  Without China’s participation, such 
initiatives are much less meaningful.  If nothing else, Ma’s peace initiative at least succeeded in 
broadcasting Taiwan’s voice internationally.  Whether anyone was listening is another question 
entirely.   
 
V.3. Carrots, Sticks, and Poker Chips: An Analogy with Taiwan’s Small but Faithful 
Troop of Diplomatic Partners 
 
 There were several countries which transferred their diplomatic recognition to the PRC 
before 1971.  The earliest converts were Soviet satellites or client states, or those who shared a 
common ideology with the CCP.  The floodgates opened, however, after the ROC lost its seat in 
the UN, and what followed was nothing less than an exodus of biblical proportions.  By 1978, 
Taiwan had only 21 diplomatic partners left.  It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze 
the foreign policy of those countries who decided to change their affiliation during this period.  
Perhaps some countries saw the writing on the wall, and assessed that the PRC was here to stay.  
Other developed countries may have been lured by China’s massive population and enormous 
potential markets.  To preserve or buy back the loyalty of poor, developing countries, Taiwan 
                                                          
176 Ma, Yingjiu, “Remarks by President Ma on Taiping Island,” Office of the President, January 28, 2016, accessed 
April 18, 2017, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=36616&rmid=2355 
60 
 
embarked upon a program of “dollar diplomacy,” purchasing allegiance with trade, aid and 
developmental assistance.177   The effectiveness of this program is open to debate, but, by 2000, 
Taiwan had managed to recover seven countries.  The years from 2000-2017, however, have 
borne witness to a slow reversal of these modest successes, and, as of early 2017, its ranks have 
dwindled back down to 22.  Except for the Vatican, its remaining disciples are poor countries in 
Africa, Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Oceania.178  Whatever competitive 
economic advantage Taiwan may have had in past decades, it is highly doubtful that it could 
compete with Beijing in a bidding war at present.  China’s nominal GDP in 2015 was $11.39 
trillion, compared with $519.1 billion for Taiwan.179  The GDP of Guangdong Province alone 
surpassed Taiwan’s in 2007.180  Even conceding that Taiwan per capita GDP is much higher than 
the Mainland’s, there is still no way that the Taiwan authorities could outspend the CCP.  The 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the PRC’s defense spending alone in 2015 was 
over twice as large as Taiwan’s entire national budget.181   
 If China could “outbid” Taiwan to poach their remaining diplomatic partners, what is 
stopping them?  Scholars suggest two possible reasons.  First, the PRC has learned from recent 
experience that its aggressive tactics with Taiwan can sometime breed perverse effects.  The 
PRC’s large-scale naval and amphibious exercised in 1994, which were all given menacing and 
highly suggestive names, like “Conquest 96” or “Doomsday of the Aircraft Carrier,” failed to 
dissuade Lee Teng-Hui from taking trips to Japan and the U.S. in 1995.  PRC missile tests in 
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1995 similarly failed to prevent the KMT from re-nominating Li for the 1996 presidential 
election.182  Politicians often correctly judge that acquiescence in the face of threats will make 
them appear weak to the voting public; for some, losing an election is a far more frightening 
prospect than starting a war.  As for the Taiwan public, China’s saber rattling steeled the voters’ 
resolve rather than softening it.  Despite an alarming round of provocations just one week before 
the presidential election, Li still garnered 54% of the popular vote, exceeding all expectations.183 
 Second, some scholars suggest that the CCP and Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration entered 
into an unspoken “diplomatic truce” to reward Ma’s dedication to repairing cross-strait relations.  
According to the implied terms of the truce, China would not “buy off” any more of Taiwan’s 
diplomatic partners if Taiwan would make positive progress in the direction of reunification.  For 
example, Gambia broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2013, but Beijing deferred 
normalization with Gambia until March 2016, after DPP candidate Tsai Ing-Wen had won the 
presidency.184 
 This brief digression was intended to analogize and illustrate another strategic function 
common to all of The Five Islands.  Beijing views the islands in much the same manner as 
Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, as political poker chips.  They can use them as carrots or sticks 
depending on Taiwan’s actions apropos of independence.  Just as the PRC could probably “steal” 
Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners, the PLA could probably seize Taiwan’s few 
remaining outer islands.  However, using the stick is a dangerous gamble for China; such 
military coercion could easily backfire, as it has in the past.  This latter point recalls the quote at 
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the beginning of the last section: “Unless there is a serious deterioration in cross-strait relations, 
Beijing could hardly justify taking military action against [Itu Aba].”  The same principle likely 
applies to the other four. 
 
VI. Checking the Pulse of Public Opinion 
 
 Governments are responsible for formulating, promulgating and implementing official 
policy, but the public always has a vote—even in places like China, where the absence of 
democratic institutions does not necessarily preclude the public from participating in subtler 
forms of political expression.  Populist pressure can sometimes override the better judgment or 
political will of experts, to which, some scholars argue, Donald Trump’s ascension to the White 
House in 2016 clearly attests.185  This section briefly assesses China, U.S., and Taiwan public 
opinion on cross-strait relations, as it pertains to the outer islands.  Understanding the thrust of 
public opinion is important because it might dictate the limits of potential military action in the 
Taiwan Strait, for all three governments.  It also offers insight into their respective populations’ 
appraisals of Taiwan’s claims over the outer islands, and whether those claims merit efforts to 
defend them.  This section also considers the identity and sensibilities of residents on the three 
kingdom islands, and explores how their lives are affected by the cross-strait game of tug-o-war.   
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VI.1. A Mixed Bag: China and U.S. Public Opinion 
 
"We will strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest efforts and utmost sincerity, 
but will never allow any 'Taiwan independence' supporters to separate Taiwan from 
China under any name or in any form." ~ Ma Xiaoguang, TAO Spokesman186 
 
 The “but” in Ma Xiaoguang’s statement above succinctly captures the spirit of modern 
China’s Taiwan policy.  Deng Xiaoping may have moved the PRC’s rhetoric away from the 
presumptive use of force in Mao’s “Liberate Taiwan” (解放台湾, jie fang tai wan) campaign, 
when he updated the slogan to “Peaceful Reunification” (和平统一, he ping tong yi) in 1979,187 
but a non-peaceful solution has remained the dagger behind Beijing’s smile.188  Nearly 70 years 
after the KMT retreated to Taiwan, national reunification is still the “strategic direction” of the 
PLA.189  
 It is much harder to ascertain Chinese public opinion on Beijing’s Taiwan policy.  The 
CCP has learned the wages of soliciting unbridled public criticism in historical episodes like the 
Hundred Flowers, Democracy Wall, or Tiananmen incidents.  There is reason to believe a formal 
Taiwan declaration of independence would arouse passionate nationalistic reactions in Mainland 
Chinese, based on past experiences following the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, the 2001 U.S. EP-3 spy plane incident, the 2008 French assault of the Olympic torch 
relay team, or the interminable sequence of Japanese “provocations.”  One U.S. survey revealed 
that 74% of Chinese respondents believed that settling accounts with Taiwan would ultimately 
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result in armed conflict.190  The acknowledgment alone, however, does not equate to approval.  
Indeed, Chinese scholar Shi Guhong cautions against this very assumption: 
“If a large-scale military conflict breaks out over the Taiwan matter…and becomes 
particularly intense and protracted due to the diehard resistance of the Taiwan authorities 
and a large-scale U.S. military intervention, we probably would not have high 
expectations that most of the Mainland Chinese people would forever actively support a 
military struggle that would have a huge cost and an uncertain outcome.”191  
 
Another scholar said, “China could let Taiwan go independent.  China is big enough to afford 
it.”192  Other voices sing a different tune, however.  One university student surmised: 
“If we can’t get Taiwan back, the Chinese government may lose its power to control the 
people.  It will show that the government is too weak to protect our territory.”193 
 
A PLA officer confessed: 
“People have very strong feelings about the Taiwan issue.  If the leaders…do nothing 
while Taiwan declares independence, the [CCP] will fall.”194 
 
And a political commentator remarked that “Taiwan is a question of regime survival—no regime 
could survive the loss of Taiwan.”195  In short, if domestic pressure is sufficiently high, the CCP 
may be compelled to make good on its threats and “see it through” to the bitter end.  If strong 
public support for a full-scale invasion is weak or uncertain, however, Beijing may settle on a 
less extreme course of action, contenting itself with modest territorial acquisitions, i.e. The Five 
Islands, which slake the public’s thirst for retribution, yet entail fewer strategic risks.   
 What about American public opinion?  The mere possibility of U.S. intervention 
represents Taiwan’s most powerful deterrent to PLA aggression.  As a liberal, Western 
democracy, U.S. foreign policy derives partly from a combination of strategic interest and expert 
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advice, but the greatest motive force is public opinion, which is much more mercurial and much 
less informed.  In fact, a 2012 Pew Research Center poll revealed that 34% of American’s 
admitted they knew nothing about cross-strait issues.  Another 54% claimed to “know a little”; 
only 10% of Americans felt comfortably aware of the key issues.  Of the 10% who claimed to 
have a workable knowledge of the situation, 48% supported U.S. intervention in the event of a 
Chinese invasion, while 43% rejected the idea.  This contrasted slightly with expert opinion, 
which largely conditioned its support on Taiwan’s conduct regarding independence activities.  
Sixty-seven percent (67%) of experts supported U.S. military intervention in response to 
unprovoked aggression, but only 27% felt that the U.S. should use force if China’s move 
followed a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan.196   
 A 2014 Chicago Council poll did not control for relative subject matter expertise, and 
therefore generated slightly different, but equally dismal results.  In this survey, only 26% of 
Americans supported military intervention on behalf of Taiwan, a response that was fairly 
consistent with the performance in seven prior Chicago Council polls conducted periodically in 
1998-2012, where support hovered between 25% and 33%.  Perhaps most surprising was the 
revelation that Americans feel fairly neutral toward Taiwan, which scored only 52 on a scale of 
0-100, where 0 indicated a “very cold, unfavorable feeling” and 100 meant a “very warm, 
favorable feeling.”197   For perspective, Turkey scored a 50 on the same scale.198        
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 Considering American’s lukewarm affection for Taiwan writ large, should one expect a 
stronger commitment toward The Five Islands?  For example, would the 34% of Americans who 
knew nothing about cross-strait relations nevertheless affirm their strong support for Taiwan’s 
opposing claim over the Pescadores?  Or would the 64% of experts who opposed intervention if 
Taiwan were invaded after a declaration of independence199 reconsider their position if it were 
Quemoy or Itu Aba that were attacked instead?  Of course not.  Because public opinion is 
uninformed, however, it is susceptible to information in ways that expert opinion is not.  Early 
on, this paper took note of Quemoy and Matsu’s absence from the news since 1985.  The 
eruption of violence on the outer islands would hurry them back to the forefront of American 
attention.  Informed—and possibly ill-informed—opinions would begin to crystallize, replacing 
ignorance, and feeding on a steady diet of emotive front line photojournalism.  Under such 
circumstances, it is nearly impossible to predict the U.S. public’s final disposition toward 
Taiwan, to say nothing of its outer islands. 
 
VI.2. The Elephant in the Room: Taiwan Public Opinion 
 
 The world has made a habit of ignoring Taiwan; what Taiwan wants appears largely 
immaterial to what it gets, and whatever it gets usually requires China’s imprimatur.  Taiwan 
public opinion on the status of the outer islands, therefore, is most germane to this study not 
because it could demand positive action from bystander nations, but because it could excuse 
passivity and inaction.  This point is admittedly subtle and deserves further explanation.  Imagine 
that Taiwan has unilaterally declared independence, and China has responded militarily by 
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amphibiously assaulting and seizing the Pescadores.   The surveys cited above indicate initially 
marginal public support for U.S. military intervention.  A White House frantically sussing out 
domestic opinion and fitfully groping for politically viable alternatives is less likely to be swayed 
by Taiwan’s foot-stomping and vehement affirmations of sovereignty than by Taiwan’s shrugs 
and blasé dismissal of the islands.  Meanwhile, the average U.S. voter and taxpayer will tune into 
the news and dive into the bowels of the internet in an attempt to “catch up” on cross-strait 
relations and Chinese modern history.  Will her evolving opinion be affected more by learning 
that Taiwan—a “country” she likes only slightly more than Turkey—is a little bigger than she 
had previously thought, or by realizing that Taiwans themselves acknowledge that the 
Pescadores really belong to the PRC?  This section will attempt to assess Taiwan public opinion 
on the status and fate of The Five Islands.  It finds that there is a certain fatalism regarding 
Quemoy and Matsu that does not apply to perceptions of the other three. 
 The author was unable to discover a single scientific survey of Taiwan public opinion 
regarding the status of The Five Islands after Taiwan independence.  In fact, the general 
academic neglect of this topic was the most important factor inspiring this study.  The absence of 
even Taiwan-administered, Chinese-language surveys invites two explanations: 1) people are 
afraid to ask the questions; or 2) people already know the answers.200  In the former case, the 
Taiwan authorities might be understandably reluctant to undertake a survey whose answers could 
betray Taiwans’ ambivalence concerning the outer islands and thus enervate bystander resolve.  
In the latter case, it is difficult for the foreign researcher to ascertain which answers the people 
already know without asking the questions.  Because there is such a dearth of authoritative 
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material which deals directly with the present subject matter, this paper is forced to consider 
sources which are less direct and less authoritative. 
 Taiwan is already a “mature and vibrant democracy.”201  In most democracies, voting is 
an outward expression of personal opinion.  Election results, therefore, collect and amalgamate 
the sum of personal opinions to form an approximation of public opinion.  So, what can elections 
tell us about Taiwan public opinion regarding The Five Islands? 
 One scholar was asked the following questions during a trip to Matsu:   
“Why does the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) flag only show Taiwan Island?  
Where are Quemoy, Matsu and the Pescadores?  Is it really possible that these four island 
groups don’t add up to a single country?”202  
 
The omission of the three kingdom islands from the DPP flag (Figure 3)203 could have been a 
purely aesthetic choice, having more to do with problems of scale than insidious political 
intentions, but the residents of Quemoy and Matsu do have some cause for worry.  In 1994, DPP 
Chairman Shi Mingde sparked a “nation-wide” controversy when he openly advocated for the 
withdrawal of Taiwan military troops from Quemoy and Matsu, a proposal titled “The Case for 
Withdrawing Troops from Quemoy and Matsu” (金马撤军论, jin ma che jun lun).  Shi argued 
that removing the overt military presence was an important step in the demilitarization of the 
Taiwan Strait and would improve the local economies of the outer islands.204  Residents on the 
islands drew an altogether different conclusion: the DPP wanted to withdraw troops as a prelude 
to abandoning the islands politically—sacrificial lambs for the cause of independence.  When 
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DPP official Chen Caineng visited Matsu in 2004 in order to find a candidate to represent 
Lianchang County in the Legislative Yuan, local trust in the DPP had not improved; Shi Mingde 
and his proposal were still the face of the Party.205  It did not help matters when another proposal, 
entitled “The Case for Abandoning Quemoy and Matsu (金马放弃论, jin ma fang qi lun), began 
circulating Taiwan cyberspace.  As of mid-2015, the DPP had still never issued an official 
statement refuting its attribution to the Party, despite numerous accusations to that effect; this 
only led to further distrust 
among the residents of Quemoy 
and Matsu.206     
 It should come as no surprise 
then that Tsai Ing-Wen’s poorest 
showings in Taiwan’s 2016 
presidential election were in 
Kinmen and Lianchang 
Counties, i.e. Quemoy and Matsu, where she secured only 18% and 16% of the local vote, 
respectively.  The KMT candidate, Eric Chu, by contrast, won 66% and 69%, his strongest 
showing “nationally.”  In Taiwan Province, Cai’s worst performance had been in Hualian 
County, where she earned 37%; Chu bagged 48% of the vote there, his biggest win after Quemoy 
and Matsu.207 These results evince a clear disjunction of public opinion between the residents of 
Fujian and Taiwan Provinces which is only adequately explained by the recognition that de jure 
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independence entails the forfeiture and retrocession of Quemoy and Matsu.  As one Taiwan 
scholar abjectly remarked: “When you talk about independence, Quemoy and Matsu, well, they 
are on the outside looking in.”208  Cai’s landslide victory in the general election, along with the 
DPP’s sweep of the Legislative Yuan, does not necessarily represent an endorsement of this 
view, but it at least means that voters in Taiwan Province are willing to overlook the Party’s 
cynical and pragmatic policy regarding Fujian Province. 
 Cai’s campaign stop in Quemoy in December 2015, one month before the election, had 
failed to smooth things over with the voters.209  Perhaps they remembered how she, while 
serving as director of the Mainland Affairs Council, had killed a desperately needed deal to pipe 
in water to Quemoy from nearby Xiamen, on the grounds that the PRC might poison it.210  Cai’s 
December pledge to revitalize the local economy has yet to pan out.  Quemoy’s deputy 
magistrate, Wu Chengdian, has proposed projects and policies which would make Quemoy more 
attractive for Mainland visitors and investors, but they have run aground of Cai’s administration.  
“We could develop so fast if they would just let us,” he lamented shortly after Cai took office in 
May 2016.211  Unless Cai acknowledges the ’92 Consensus, however, things are unlikely to 
improve for Quemoy and Matsu.  A referendum is expected on Quemoy in late 2017 to decide 
whether to develop the gaming industry, which could attract significant capital flows from the 
Mainland.  Even if the referendum succeeds locally, however, it will face a difficult test in the 
Yuan, where Cai and her DPP vocally oppose the move.  Similarly, Matsu voters already agreed 
in 2012 to allow gambling on their islands, but final approval still rests with the Yuan.212    
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 What about the Pescadores?  The verdict from the 2016 general election—51% of 
Penghu County residents voted for Cai213—suggests that the Pescadores’ territorial status is more 
secure than that of Quemoy or Matsu.  Furthermore, its residents overwhelmingly (81%) rejected 
a proposal to allow gaming on the Pescadores in a 2016 referendum, indicating that they share 
Cai’s distaste for the troubles Mainland investment and Mainland gamblers might spell for the 
local economy and environment.214  Lastly, there is a conspicuous absence of public debate about 
the islands’ post-independence fate, suggesting that most Taiwans’ feel that the Pescadores, 
unlike Quemoy or Matsu, share a common destiny with the main island of Taiwan, whatever that 
may be.    
 As for the two castle islands, Itu Aba and Pratas, there is no local opinion to consider, 
since all activities on them are “entirely governmental in nature.”  Taiwan domestic opinion 
exhibits a nationalistic possessiveness over the them, however, signaled by the Executive Yuan’s 
rejection of the July 2016 PCA award, the hysterical editorials which saturated newspapers and 
media outlets and fiercely denounced the court’s ruling that Itu Aba was not an island, and by the 
angry street protests retaliating against the U.S.’s disapproval of Ma Ying-Jeou’s visit to Itu Aba 
in January 2016.215  These reactions could belie a grim, subconscious acceptance of the islands’ 
inevitable retrocession, but there is no evidence to support this.   
 In short, Taiwan public opinion seems to suggest an admission that Quemoy and Matsu 
could not survive Taiwan independence, but this concession does not appear to extend to the 
other three islands, i.e. the Pescadores, Itu Aba, and Pratas.  Once again, Taiwans’ assertions of 
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sovereignty over the latter three will have little to no bearing on China’s decision to seize them, 
and are unlikely to be a decisive factor in overcoming U.S. hesitation to intervene.  The Taiwan 
public’s implicit abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu, however, will make it easier for the U.S. 
to wash their hands of them as well.  If the PRC can exploit these inconsistencies by attacking 
Quemoy or Matsu first, they could cause the American public to ask the same question many 
military officers, government officials and other experts asked during the 1st and 2nd Taiwan 
Strait Crises: If we didn’t defend those other islands, why are we willing to go to war over these?      
 
VI.3. Is a Plebiscite Possible?  
 
 One Mainland commentator likened Quemoy and Matsu to “a thorn, catching in the 
throats of [Taiwan] separatists.”216  Considering all of the evidence supporting this metaphor, is 
it conceivable that Taiwans themselves may someday choose to pluck out the “thorn?”  The 
possibility of a future referendum on the retrocession of The Five Islands deserves a brief 
examination here, not because it is particularly probable—in fact, there is absolutely no 
indication that such a plebiscite is forthcoming—but because it represents a plausible pathway 
for outer island retrocession, which is the central theme of this paper.   Such a referendum could 
originate from two potential sources: 1) Taiwan’s general population, or 2) the kingdom islands’ 
resident population.   
 In the case of the Pescadores, either scenario is quite difficult to imagine.  Since the 
islands’ residents voted for the DPP in 2016—the party habitually associated with Taiwan’s 
independence movement and the notion of “Taiwanese-ness”—they ostensibly identify with 
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voters on the main island.  For its part, the general population shows no sign of fatalism 
regarding the Pescadores in a post-independence environment, and appears to accept Taiwan’s 
opposing claim to them as an established fact; the conspicuous lack of related commentary is 
strong evidence of this.  Therefore, a referendum is unnecessary and unlikely, because the 
Pescadores do not wish to retrocede on the one hand, and Taiwan does not wish to cede them on 
the other.  A Chinese invasion of the islands might challenge the latter assumption, however, 
especially if military efforts to recover them threaten Taiwan’s general security, or if the 
Pescadores become a new “thorn,” choking Taiwan’s hopes for independence. 
 By virtue of their status as castle islands, a local referendum on Itu Aba or Pratas is 
unthinkable.  A general Taiwan referendum, on the other hand, is distinctly possible.  
Admittedly, Taiwans currently exhibit a nationalistic possessiveness of the islands, but this paper 
has already exposed the difficulties their congruency presents for post-independence sovereignty 
claims.  If the Taiwan public senses that their ownership of these islands jeopardizes the broader 
case for independence, or if violence erupts in the South China Sea (SCS), threatening Taiwan’s 
“national” security or its international good standing, Taiwans could be induced to relinquish 
them to the PRC.   Under such circumstances, China would be gravely concerned about the 
implications for cross-strait relations, and Taiwan’s departure from the SCS would subtract from 
the islands’ strategic value.  However, China would be compelled to occupy them nonetheless, 
lest one of the other littoral states seize the opportunity first.  
 As for Quemoy and Matsu, the possibility of either a local or “national” referendum is 
greater, but still unlikely.  A rare 2006 study revealed that Quemoy’s residents identify culturally 
with the Mainland, but politically with Taiwan.217  Voters’ overwhelming support for the KMT 
                                                          
217 Wei, Jianfeng. “An Examination of Cultural Identity of Residents of Quemoy (Kinmen),” Intercultural 
Communications Studies XV:1 (2006)  
74 
 
in 2016, in complete disproportion to the rest of Taiwan, suggests that the residents of Quemoy 
and Matsu fear the prospect of retrocession.  A referendum would therefore be counterintuitive, 
if not preposterous.  The study cited above, however, implies that Taiwan’s democratic freedoms 
comprise the strongest link between the offshore islands and Taiwan.  If the Mainland were to 
liberalize politically and modernize economically, retrocession may appear more attractive.  This 
is especially true if the islands must continue to make economic sacrifices to support Cai’s 
political agenda, which does not include deeper entanglements with the Mainland.  The benefits 
of her New Southbound Policy, if they ever amount to anything, will accrue only indirectly to 
Quemoy and Matsu, which both stand to gain far more from strengthening ties directly with 
nearby Xiamen and Fuzhou.  One Quemoy resident grumbled, “People in Taiwan regard 
Quemoy as a faraway place, and in their mind, Quemoy seems to belong to mainland China.”218  
If the “faraway” central government kills the offshores’ gambling bill, or if the Executive Yuan 
continues to stymie the local governments’ economic cooperation initiatives, the political 
advantages of Taiwan citizenship may eventually lose their gloss.  
 A “national” referendum to abandon Quemoy and Matsu is a dubious proposition because 
it is both politically unnecessary and morally inexcusable, like choosing to expose an unwanted 
child even when less drastic options are available.  Quemoy and Matsu are “thorns” in the throat 
of Taiwan separatists, not because they prevent Taiwans from declaring independence, but 
because pain is the ineluctable result of such a declaration.  A referendum would obviate the 
dreaded Chinese invasion, effectively transforming Taiwan into the villain for ceding the islands 
against their will.  This makes little to no sense.  If Quemoy and Matsu are destined to rejoin the 
Mainland either way, why not require the PRC to assume agency, thereby exculpating Taiwan?  
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If the concern is to avoid a violent outcome on the islands, withdrawing Taiwan’s troops 
achieves that end without the distasteful implications of outright political abandonment.  Indeed, 
this realization likely formed the basis for DPP Chairman Shi Mingde’s proposal to do just that 
in 1994.   
 However improbable a referendum regarding the retrocession of Quemoy and Matsu 
might be, it is worth considering the PRC’s response if one ever came to pass.  For Beijing, 
receiving the offshores without a fight is a worrisome prospect.219  If the PRC is to preserve the 
islands’ strategic value as a bridge maintaining political access to Taiwan, it would be compelled 
to ignore the results of the referendum, like a man ignoring the doorbell and pretending not to be 
at home in order to avoid the legal process server on the front porch.  Even in an extreme case, 
such as a Taiwan military crackdown on Quemoy or Matsu after a local referendum approving 
retrocession, China is unlikely to follow Russia’s example in the Ukraine because, unlike 
Moscow’s interests in the Crimean Peninsula, Beijing’s interests in the offshores are 
preventative, not acquisitive.  If China refrained from intervening, they would score the double 
win of maintaining the status quo and framing Taiwan as a violent, oppressive regime.   
 
VII. Patterns of Uncertainty: Has the U.S. Learned Anything from the 1st and 2nd Taiwan 
Strait Crises? 
 
“My colleagues, the rank and file working officer, more familiar with the facts of the 
two Chinas, were inclined towards…well, I would guess that seven out of ten of such 
people would have opted for Communist China at the time.”220  
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 What a difference a day makes.   Before June 25, 1950, Chiang’s Nationalist regime on 
Taiwan was under a prolonged death watch.  In August 1949, the U.S. State Department had 
produced the legendary “China White Paper,” a 1500-page tome intended to exonerate the 
Truman administration, distance America from China’s ongoing civil war, and place the blame 
for “losing China” squarely on the shoulders of the KMT regime.221  Later that year, the U.S. 
turned off its economic and military assistance to the Nationalists,222 and few experts and 
officials expected Chiang to survive the presumably imminent Communist invasion of Taiwan, 
which the chargé d'affaires in Taipei, Robert Strong, estimated would occur sometime between 
June 15 and the end of July, 1950.223  Instead, however, the Korean People’s Army tumbled over 
the 38th parallel on June 25, prompting Truman’s decision to neutralize the Taiwan Strait.  
Marshall Green, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, reminisced: 
“What I can’t remember historically is exactly what the line was that we were about to 
take in the time when the Korean War broke out.  I think we were beginning to consider 
quite seriously at that time whether we shouldn’t move our policy towards recognizing 
the realities of Mainland China, that the Chinese had taken over, and that they did 
represent one-quarter of humanity, and that we had to have some kind of relationship 
with them…had the war with Korea not intervened, it is possible that our China policy 
could have moved in a different direction.”224 
 
 Thus, in just twenty-four little hours, the U.S. had tacked back to its earlier position, and 
hitched its diplomatic cart to the same old horse, i.e. Chiang and his KMT.  This development in 
and of itself, however, still fails to explain how the U.S. came to seriously consider the 
employment of nuclear weapons against targets on Mainland China during the 1st and 2nd Taiwan 
Strait Crises.  This “outsized response” appears all the more extraordinary when one recalls that 
the catalyst for the conflict had been no more than a “routine harassment” in the offshore islands 
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of Quemoy and Matsu,225 which most experts agreed were “strategically valueless.”  Yet, in a 
March 16, 1954 press conference, Eisenhower suggested that atomic weapons could be used “as 
you use a bullet or anything else.”226  Then, during the third presidential debate in 1960, Nixon 
and Kennedy argued about the employment of nuclear weapons specifically within the context of 
the offshore islands.227  Even setting the nuclear option aside, the U.S. was undeniably prepared 
to go to war with China over the offshore islands, to the nearly universal consternation of the 
international community.  Why?  What was Eisenhower thinking? 
 Three primary factors motivated the U.S. government’s over-commitment to the offshore 
islands: 1) The China Lobby and the “Red Scare,” 2) Dulles’ signature doctrine of “mass 
retaliation” and “collective security,” and 3) the administration’s conviction that Chiang had “bet 
the farm” on Quemoy and Matsu. 
   John Melby, lead author of the China White Paper, described the China Lobby in the 
following manner: 
“The China Lobby was the antecedent of the so-called Committee of One Million.  It 
was composed of people from a whole political spectrum, from the far right to the far 
left, who had only one thing in common: for whatever their reasons, they were in 
complete support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.  That was the only thing they 
were united on because of anti-communism.  The American obsession with 
communism.”228 
 
The Soviets’ first nuclear test in 1949, the “erection” of the Iron Curtain, the outbreak of the 
Korean War, and the Rosenberg trials, all operated in concert to incite a “Red Scare” in 
Washington.  McCarthyism infected the ranks of Congress and the State Department alike and 
clouded decision making.  Several good Foreign Service officers and sinologists were purged 
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during this period, including Tony Freeman, Jack Service, and Owen Lattimore, who were all 
later vindicated.229  Even though history has lifted the veil on Mao’s true political intentions 
during the 1st and 2nd Strait Crises—invasion was not an immediate goal—the U.S. quickly came 
to view the offshore islands as a “test of containment—as to whether or not [the Communists] 
would by force be able to throw out Western power or a power supported by the West from these 
small islands.”230   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford thundered, “If 
we fail to resist this aggression, we commit the United States further to a negative policy which 
could result in a progressive loss of free world strength to local aggression until or unless all-out 
conflict is forced upon us.”231  Dulles ratcheted up the pressure by demonizing the CCP: “The 
aggressive fanaticism of the Chinese Communist leaders presents a certain parallel to that of 
Hitler.”232  This type of grandstanding produced the desired effect in a population plagued by 
McCarthyist paranoia.  The landslide passage of the Formosa Resolution, granting Eisenhower 
carte blanche to use military force to protect the Nationalists on the offshores, is clear evidence 
of this.  The resolution claimed that the PLA bombardment of the islands was “in aid of and in 
preparation for an armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores.”233  Senator Lehman led a 
feeble effort to introduce an amendment to the resolution prohibiting military intervention on 
Quemoy and Matsu; the Senate struck it down 74-13.  When the final resolution came up for a 
vote, most of the dissidents quailed, and it easily cleared the House (409-3) and the Senate (85-3) 
on January 25, 1955.234  Had it not been for Premier Zhou Enlai’s timely and conciliatory gesture 
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at the Bandung Conference on April 23, 1955,235 the U.S.’s miscalculations may have propelled 
the conflict into a full-scale nuclear war. 
 This paper suggested earlier that elections are expressions of public opinion.  A corollary 
is that congressional and executive actions are self-conscious reflections of public opinion.  In a 
liberal democracy, politicians must play to the gallery or face political extinction.  What other 
factor could suffice to explain this gulf between expertise and populism, where “seven out of 
ten” China hands favored transferring diplomatic recognition to the PRC, while only 0.7% of the 
House disapproved the use of force in the offshores?  What explains the American public’s 
psychological attachment to “Free China?”  Was it the Red Scare?  Was it the effectiveness of 
Madame Song’s charm offensive?  Was is the American tendency to root for the underdog?  For 
the purposes of this paper, it does not matter.  The important point is that public opinion, unlike 
expert opinion, is fickle and suggestible…and it is all-powerful.   
 A second, related factor which nearly propelled the U.S. into a nuclear war with China 
was the recent promulgation of Secretary of State John F. Dulles’s concepts of “collective 
security” and “massive retaliation,” outlined in Dulles’s April 1954 essay in Foreign Affairs 
magazine.  According to Dulles, collective security was the best prescription for containing the 
cancer of Communism because it pooled the energy and resources of the alliance network and 
thereby avoided runaway defense spending and a self-destructive arms race with the Soviet bloc.  
Regarding massive retaliation, Dulles did not mince words: collective security included the 
preemptive use of “atomic weapons which are now available in a wide range, suitable not only 
for strategic bombing but also for extensive tactical use.”   The threat of massive retaliation was 
the lynchpin of strategic deterrence; it was necessary to convince a potential aggressor that the 
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“probable hurt will outbalance the probable gain.”  There is no allusion to Chiang or the Chinese 
Nationalists in his essay, and only an oblique reference to the PRC—the PLA did not begin 
shelling the offshores in earnest until September—but the following excerpt foreshadows the 
Formosa Resolution and the new policy’s application to Quemoy and Matsu: 
“In every endangered area there should be a sufficient military establishment to maintain 
order against subversion and to resist other forms of indirect aggression and minor 
satellite aggressions. This serves the indispensable need to demonstrate a purpose to 
resist, and to compel any aggressor to expose his real intent by such serious fighting as 
will brand him before all the world and promptly bring collective measures into 
operation…[I]n such areas the main reliance must be on the power of the free 
community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at places of its own choice.”236 
 
 Make no mistake.  When actively serving U.S. cabinet members write pieces in Foreign 
Affairs, the result is not a policy recommendation…It is official policy.237  Eight months after his 
essay appeared in print, the U.S. signed its MDF with the ROC, formally admitting Taiwan into 
the collective security framework of the Western Pacific.  The 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait Crises,238 
therefore, were construed as a direct challenge to the new policy.  Would it stand, or would it 
fall?  It did not necessarily matter that the offshores were not explicitly covered by the terms of 
the treaty.  If Eisenhower and Dulles had stood idly by as KMT forces were massacred on 
Quemoy and Matsu, their political reputations would have suffered, calling Eisenhower’s 
sincerity into question when he blustered that he “would rather be impeached than fail to do his 
duty [in the offshores].”239  The state of public opinion in 1955, manifested by the strength of the 
China Lobby, suggests that impeachment was not the price of doing his duty.  Quite the opposite, 
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it would have been far more likely to follow from him not doing his duty.  However, “I’ll be 
impeached if I don’t do something” has a slightly less heroic tone. 
 The concepts of collective security and massive retaliation still operate in U.S. foreign 
policy today, although in an attenuated form.  For example, the U.S. is far less glib about the 
employment of nuclear weapons.  However, most of the U.S. bilateral security arrangements 
penned during the post-war era are still in effect.  In fact, strengthening and expanding the 
existing network of alliances remains a focal point of U.S. long-term security strategy in the 
region.240  The U.S. security commitment toward Taiwan weakened after 1972, when the U.S. 
agreed to withdraw its troops from Taiwan.241  The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act replaced the 
MDF, which was dissolved on January 1, 1980.242  The TRA articulated, however, a nebulous 
commitment to Taiwan’s capacity for self-defense, which included U.S. arms sales.  When 
defining Taiwan’s territorial boundaries, the TRA’s language follows the example of its 
predecessor by avoiding clarity.  Consider the relevant passages below: 
“For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean 
in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the 
United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. 
The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may 
be determined by mutual agreement.”243 
 
The MDF expressly added the last clause to leave room for the offshores, should the president 
decide to defend them. 
“For the purposes of this act… the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, 
the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and 
other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those 
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islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the 
Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities 
(including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).”244   
 
The imprecision and complexity of the TRA’s language also raises questions.  Unlike the MDF, 
it does not include overt allowances for territorial expansion, but what does it mean by “the 
islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores?”  Does this phrase denote only the main island of Taiwan 
and the Pescadores, or does it mean “the islands of Taiwan—e.g. the main island, Orchid Island, 
Green Island, Agincourt, Itu Aba, etc.—and the Pescadores?”  Also, does including “the 
governing authorities” in the definition of Taiwan mean that territories under the ROC’s 
governance are also included?  After all, there is an indisputable presence of ROC “governing 
authorities” on all of The Five Islands.  Of course, it is possible that this ambiguity is both 
intentional and necessary—a strategic ambiguity.  The advantage of ambiguity is that China’s 
uncertainty about the prospects of U.S. military intervention in The Five Islands may have a 
deterrent effect.  The disadvantage is that the U.S. itself may be equally unsure about what 
exactly it is prepared to do.   
A final factor was Chiang’s intractable position on Quemoy and Matsu.  The 
Generalissimo had only ever agreed to evacuate the Dachens in January 1955 because “it 
involved, at least implicitly, a greater commitment by us [the U.S.] to the other offshores, the 
bigger ones, Jinmen [Quemoy] and Mazu [Matsu] particularly.”245  It has already been noted 
above how he refused to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu in April 1955, even with the 
promise of a 500-mile long U.S. naval blockade of the Chinese coast and U.S. nuclear weapons 
stationed on Taiwan.  U.S. advisors and politicians were concerned that a Nationalist defeat on 
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Quemoy and Matsu would undermine military morale and sow political discord on Taiwan, 
making a bad situation worse.246  Chiang had “bet the farm” on Quemoy and Matsu and 
buffaloed the U.S. administration into coming along for the ride.  While the American public and 
the U.S. Congress had signaled their support for his symbolic stand on the offshores, there can be 
little doubt that if Chiang had wanted to withdraw, Eisenhower would not have stood in his way. 
The DPP’s sweep of the Executive and Legislative Yuan in 2016 shows that today’s ROC 
is very different from Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian regime.  Although it is unclear how far the 
Taiwan people are prepared to go to defend Quemoy and Matsu, they are certainly more 
ambivalent than Chiang was in 1954-1958.  As for the American people, the reader will recall an 
earlier quote from John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential debate, where he favored a more 
limited line of U.S. commitment.  His subsequent victory in the elections suggests that his 
position was not irreconcilable with public opinion.  Furthermore, this study has already 
demonstrated that many modern Americans are not only unaware of Quemoy’s and Matsu’s 
existence, but are even unenthusiastic about a more general defense of Taiwan.  Ironically, a 
2016 Chicago Council poll found that Americans felt more favorable toward China (67) in 2016 
than they did toward Taiwan (52) in 2014.247  The tide of public opinion can ebb and flow very 
quickly, and there is no guarantee that today’s trends are tomorrow’s realities.            
In short, the external forces which motivated the U.S.’s decision to support the 
Nationalists’ defense of Quemoy and Matsu in the 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait Crises have largely 
disappeared: the Red Scare is over; the China Lobby is gone; Eisenhower’s foreign policy is 
                                                          
246 Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis." International Security (1988): 
103 
247 Friedhoff, Karl, and Craig Kafura. “Views from the G2: Public Opinion in the US & China,” The Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, December 1, 2016, accessed April 27, 2017, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/views-
g2-public-opinion-us-china 
84 
 
history; and Taiwan no longer “clings” to the offshores with Chiang’s tenacity.  Many of the 
underlying internal forces which gave rise to these phenomena, however, remain essentially 
unresolved: there is still a struggle between expertise and populism; the U.S. retains its reliance 
and emphasis on “networked” regional security; and the substance of our commitment to Taiwan 
is stubbornly uncertain.  Therefore, if China moves against The Five Islands, there really is no 
telling how the U.S. might respond.  It is entirely possible that current or future administrations 
will make the same mistakes that Eisenhower made; that is, they will discard expert 
recommendations, play to the gallery, and conflate the fate of The Five Islands with the destiny 
of Taiwan itself.  This is especially true if the U.S. leadership has not anticipated China’s designs 
against the other three islands, i.e. Itu Aba, Pratas, and the Pescadores.      
                 
VIII. The Yellow Brick Road to Retrocession 
 
“Actually, fragmentation constitutes one of the few political crimes left in China; the 
worst epithet is not capitalist or counterrevolutionary, but splittist. This charge is leveled 
against those who give a critical view of Chinese desires for reunification with Taiwan 
or of China's occupation of Tibet and Xinjiang.”248 
 
 A July 2016 editorial in the People’s Daily identified the Taiwan issue as “the last bit of 
unfinished business in the great work of national reunification.”  The author goes on to suggest 
that the resolution of the “Taiwan problem” should share a place of equal importance with the 
attainment of the two centenary goals (两个一百年, liang ge yi bai nian) 249  of Xi Jinping’s 
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“China Dream” (中国梦, zhong guo meng) of national rejuvenation.250  Nearly sixty years 
earlier, three Chinese academics described the “liberation of Taiwan” as the Chinese nation’s 
“sacred and incommutable duty.”251  Can the “China Dream” become a reality without national 
reunification?  More importantly, do the Chinese people believe it can?  
 William Callahan reflects that Chinese nationalism can only be understood in the context 
of national humiliation, and that the recovery of lost territory is crucial to expunging the shame 
of China’s past.  He quotes a relevant passage from the Chinese Book of Rites (礼记, li ji) to 
illustrate how this idea is entrenched in the collective consciousness: 
"The humiliation of a thing is sufficient to stimulate it; the humiliation of a country is 
sufficient to rejuvenate it.” 252 
 
 He draws a compelling comparison between China’s physical disarticulation at the hands of 
foreign invaders in the 19th Century and the resulting psychological fragmentation of the Chinese 
people.253  Much has been written in recent years of China’s Patriotic Education Campaign, 
begun in the early 1990s and designed to forge a national identity grounded in nationalism and 
recast the image of the CCP as a national savior who delivered China from a “century of 
humiliation” (百年国耻, bai nian guo chi).  The interplay between salvation and humiliation is 
instrumental in the formation of two important features of nationalism, i.e. pride and anger.  The 
periodic outpourings of sometimes violent nationalism in China in the late 1990s and throughout 
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the 2000s, and the more recent phenomenon of internet nationalism among groups like the 
“Angry Youth” or “Little Pink,” suggest that the campaign has done its job.  Will Chinese 
nationalists swallow their pride and suppress their anger if Taiwan declares independence?  Can 
the CCP be a savior if it fails to reunify the nation and redeem China’s fractured identity?  Can 
humiliation be expunged if Taiwan and the international community succeed in permanently 
“amputating” Taiwan from the Chinese Motherland? 
 The PRC has never delineated the exact lengths to which it is prepared to go in order to 
prevent the separation of Taiwan, but it has also never equivocated on two basic principles: 1) 
reunification with Taiwan is a vital national interest, and 2) non-peaceful measures are on the 
table.  In 1954, Zhou Enlai declared that “Taiwan is China's sacred and inviolable territory and 
that no U.S. infringement or occupation will be tolerated.”254  Two years later, he reiterated that 
“there are two ways for the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, that is, by war or by peaceful 
means, and that the Chinese people would seek to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it 
is possible.”255  In 1971, Mao himself professed that “the Chinese people are determined to 
liberate Taiwan, to safeguard the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.”256  Deng 
Xiaoping’s 1979 assertion that “China hopes to resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means,”257 
carries the unsubtle implication of alternative non-peaceful means, i.e. when Peace has run her 
course, the baton will pass to War.  A 1993 PRC white paper identified reunification with 
Taiwan as a “fundamental interest of the Chinese nation”258 and “a sacrosanct mission of the 
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entire Chinese people.”259 In a 1997 press conference, PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian 
averred that that "the PRC would never renounce the use of force, specifically against the 
Taiwan independence movement, movements to split the motherland, and intervention by 
foreign forces.”260  The 1998 PRC defense white paper proclaimed the following: 
“The Chinese government seeks to achieve the reunification of the country by peaceful 
means, but will not commit itself not to resort to force. Every sovereign state has the 
right to use all means it thinks necessary, including military means, to safeguard its own 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”261 
 
A 2000 white paper kept faith with China’s long-standing position by emphasizing that “China 
will do its best to achieve peaceful reunification but will not commit itself to rule out the use of 
force.”262  It also added ominously that China could not “allow the resolution of the Taiwan issue 
to be postponed indefinitely.”263  The 2005 Anti-Secession Law flatly stated that the failure or 
“exhaustion” of peaceful means would necessitate the employment of “non-peaceful means and 
other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.”264  These 
statements and documents exhibit a remarkable and almost monolithic uniformity and 
consistency spanning several decades.  Is it all just bravado?  When Taiwan declares 
independence, will China abjure all its threats and ultimatums?  Will it impotently beat its chest 
and stamp its feet, but stop short of violence?  In short, is China’s Taiwan policy all bark and no 
bite?  Of course, only time will tell.   
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 A 2004 Duke University study found that nearly 76% of Taiwans believed that China 
would invade Taiwan if it declared independence.265  The credibility of China’s deterrent 
supplies the best explanation, therefore, for Taiwans’ overwhelming support for the “status quo” 
(79.8%), even though most citizens (75.8%) agreed that Taiwan had already achieved de facto 
independence.266  However, is it possible to maintain any status quo indefinitely?  Taiwans could 
certainly continue to put off a definitive outcome, but if cross-strait relations remain in perpetual 
stasis, it would be the first time in history that a political situation has avoided change 
completely.  This paper agrees with the Taiwans’ pessimism and takes China at its word.  It 
answers “no” to all of the questions posed earlier in this section:  no, the Chinese people do not 
believe in a “China Dream” without national reunification; no, Chinese nationalism will not 
remain mute and stand idly by if Taiwan declares independence; no, China is not prevaricating 
about its nationalist interests or its willingness to resort to force.   This does not mean the destiny 
of Taiwan is preordained, however.  Quite the contrary.  The denouement of this grand drama 
has yet to unfold.  However, there appear to be only three plausible, final outcomes for the 
“Taiwan problem”:  
  1. peaceful reunification 
  2. non-peaceful reunification 
  3. de jure independence 
 None of these scenarios will develop overnight.  All of them will likely evolve along a 
gradual continuum whose trajectory wobbles unsteadily and confounds accurate analysis and 
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prediction.  Just when one eventuality seems relatively assured, a “black swan” or “deus ex 
machina” might foist itself upon the stage and disrupt the plot’s momentum.  Conceivably, the 
PLA could execute a blitzkrieg assault on the main island of Taiwan, catching the international 
community unawares, but such an attack is burdened with a suffocating weight of strategic risk.  
What if Taiwan’s military defies all expectations, repels the invaders and utterly defeats the 
PLA?  What if the U.S. anticipates China’s move and overcomes its own partisanship and 
indecision to intervene quickly and militarily?  What if China wins the battle, but loses the war—
a Pyrrhic victory whose resulting military expenditures, international censure and sanctions, 
along with the potential for a protracted and bloody counterinsurgency fight, irreparably harm 
China’s economic growth, provoking domestic unrest and political instability.  China might be 
willing to face these consequences, but it is unlikely to choose to face them all at once, especially 
since an unmeasured response could easily force an unfavorable result.  Rather than “betting the 
pot,” the PRC is far more likely to “play it safe,” pursuing a graduated response that 
incrementally imposes costs on Taiwan in order to bring its leaders back to their senses.  The 
three final outcomes presented above, therefore, represent end states; it is not within the scope of 
this paper to speculate how they will come to pass.  
 The subtitle of this paper is “For Taiwan’s Outer Islands, an Uncertain Future Holds a 
Certain Fate.”  We have come full circle then.  Early on, this paper contended that The Five 
Islands will retrocede to Mainland China regardless of which outcome Taiwan ultimately faces.  
Reunification, whether peaceful or not, naturally entails China’s recovery of the islands.  Of 
course, there are other conceivable outcomes.  For example: a third-party state could invade one 
or all of them; one or more of the islands could press for independence from either China or 
Taiwan; or rising sea levels or tectonic upheavals could swallow them up entirely.  None of these 
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outcomes are plausible in the near term, however, and it is difficult to imagine a post-
reunification future for The Five Islands which does not involve Chinese sovereignty.        
 As stated earlier, de jure independence for Taiwan implies that China is either unable to 
successfully invade the main island of Taiwan, or is unwilling to take the risk.  As to the question 
of China’s ability, a U.S. Naval War College (USNWC) study, published in 2001, concluded that 
the PLA was incapable of seizing Taiwan, but that their capacity was likely to improve in the 
coming five to twenty years.267   However, the DOD’s 2016 report to Congress suggested that 
such an operation still presents China with an unacceptably high degree of tactical and strategic 
risk.268  The USNWC study postulated that the PLA would conduct a “phased invasion,” wherein 
it seizes the offshores and the Pescadores in advance of a final assault on Taiwan.  In 2001, there 
were approximately 60,000 Taiwan military troops on the Pescadores; therefore, the preliminary 
seizure of those islands would be essential to prevent the harassment of China’s flank during the 
main assault.  The outer islands seizures would also serve as a full-dress rehearsal of the PLA’s 
amphibious capability, untested in combat since 1955, and would be less likely to provoke 
foreign intervention.  Furthermore, if the Taiwan military presented a determined defense of the 
islands, it would only weaken their defensive capacity on Taiwan, due to the resulting attrition of 
personnel, resources, and political will.269   The DOD report agrees that an invasion of The Five 
Islands is within the PLA’s operational capacity.270  Ultimately, therefore, even if China were 
unable to successfully invade Taiwan, it could at least succeed in seizing the offshores and the 
Pescadores during the initial phases of the operation.  Under such circumstances, their 
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subsequent withdrawal from the islands would be highly improbable, and it is equally unlikely 
that China would allow Taiwan to retain the sideline islands of Itu Aba and Pratas.  For its part, 
the Taiwan military would not have the capacity to counterattack and recover the islands, and the 
U.S. would be unlikely to risk a direct war with China by joining Taiwan in offensive operations. 
 The PRC could also be unwilling to undertake a full-scale invasion of Taiwan because it 
believes the strategic costs are too high, and its corresponding confidence in the PLA is too low.  
Even in this situation, however, The Five Islands would be an irresistible target.  While the 
strategic risk would remain high, the operational risk is much lower, and “such a [limited] 
invasion would demonstrate military capability and political resolve while achieving tangible 
territorial gain and simultaneously showing some measure of restraint.”271  It would also partially 
mollify Chinese nationalist anger and restore a modicum of nationalist pride.   
 Of course, there are countless other ways that China could punish Taiwan for achieving 
independence.  Politically, it could poach Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners and block 
Taiwan’s access to international organizations and activities.  Economically, it could seize 
Taiwan’s assets and investment on the Mainland, cut off all trade relations, and encourage 
regional partners to join in punitive sanctions against Taiwan.  Militarily, it could conduct 
surgical air strikes and ballistic missile attacks against Taiwan’s military and industrial 
infrastructure; it might even target population centers.  It could also establish a naval quarantine 
or blockade to asphyxiate Taiwan’s seaborne trade and cut off its oil supplies.  The final, 
hypothetical outcome of “de jure independence,” however, dictates that all of these measures 
have failed to recover sovereignty over Taiwan.  If Taiwan achieves independence, only outer 
island seizures allow China to recover lost territory.  To invoke the amputation analogy 
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suggested earlier, would a patient direct the doctor to take the whole arm because he cannot keep 
the hand?  Outer island seizures also represent the only suitable task for China’s 1.25 million 
ground forces.272  Air and missile strikes, and naval blockades will only involve the PLA Air 
Force, Rocket Force, and Navy; as the largest and “proudest” service in the PLA, the Army will 
likely apply for some degree of involvement.273 
 As long as China can signal to bystander nations that its military designs do not extend 
beyond The Five Islands to the main island of Taiwan, those nations are less likely to intervene.  
Bystander nations would prefer to remain passive.  The superiority of China’s historic title over 
The Five Islands, coupled with Taiwan’s own ambivalence about them, especially Quemoy and 
Matsu, will only contribute to bystander nations’ hesitation and confirm their initial bias for 
restraint.   
 If Taiwan has irreversibly achieved independence, moreover, The Five Islands lose their 
strategic value as a forum for cross-strait communication and cooperation.  This paper has 
already demonstrated that this strategic function of the islands was one of the few factors 
preventing further PRC aggressions against them.  With Taiwan removed irretrievably from 
China’s reach, these barriers to aggression would no longer exist. 
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IX. Five Turtles in a Flask: A Policy Recommendation and Conclusion 
 
“Therefore that treaty [the MDF] does not commit the United States to defend anything 
except Formosa and the Pescadores, and to deal with acts against that treaty area. I 
completely sustained the treaty. I voted for it. I would take any action necessary to 
defend the treaty, Formosa, and the Pescadores Island.”274 ~ John F. Kennedy (1960) 
 
 President Kennedy was arguing for strategic clarity, as opposed to the principle of 
strategic ambiguity, embodied in legal documents like the MDF, Formosa Resolution, or the 
TRA.  The vagueness of the language in these documents causes the PRC, Taiwan, and other 
bystander nations to question: Will the U.S. intervene on Taiwan’s behalf?  If so, at what point?  
Many experts and scholars have blamed the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity for precipitating 
conflicts like the 1st and 2nd Taiwan Strait Crises, which brought the U.S. and China to the very 
brink of nuclear war.   
   In bilateral or multilateral negotiations, however, ambiguity affords a distinct advantage.  
A negotiator’s rejection of ambiguity in favor of clarity is intended to establish mutual trust and 
understanding.  Unfortunately, trust cannot operate in negotiations among adversaries; there is 
always an underlying assumption of mendacity and predation.  Even if the U.S. were to 
communicate its “bottom line,”—e.g. Taiwan—in good faith and in no uncertain terms, China 
would remain convinced that there is still room for negotiation.275  China would misconstrue the 
U.S.’s bottom line as an initial bargaining position, a cognitive bias known as the “anchoring 
effect.”276  Far better for the U.S. to acknowledge China’s implacable distrust and deliberately 
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open negotiations with an unacceptable offer—e.g. Taiwan and all of The Five Islands.  When 
the “negotiation” ends with China’s successful acquisition of The Five Islands, but their failure 
to secure Taiwan, both sides can leave the table feeling like they have achieved something.  The 
consolation prize of Taiwan’s outer islands is unlikely to palliate the sting of losing Taiwan, but 
at least China would not go home empty-handed.  The acclaimed sinologist Nancy Bernkopf-
Tucker argues that China’s incurable distrust of the U.S. makes strategic clarity far more 
dangerous than ambiguity.277   
 This paper agrees with Bernkopf-Tucker’s assessment but offers a caveat: The U.S. 
should maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity, but internal clarity.  During the 1st and 2nd 
Taiwan Strait Crises, the disjunction of expert and public opinion produced confusion and self-
doubt in the Eisenhower administration that nearly catapulted the U.S. into war with China.  If 
the U.S. does not “privately” identify its “bottom line” before entering negotiations with China, 
it may find itself repeating the same mistakes.    
 On August 28, 1958, five days after PLA artillery inaugurated the 2nd Taiwan Strait 
Crisis, PRC propagandists broadcasted the following message to KMT defenders on the offshore 
islands: 
“Quemoy and Matsu have become as helpless as a pair of turtles entrapped in a 
flask…Officers and men of the Chiang armed forces on Quemoy and Matsu…kill the 
U.S. advisors and defect to our side.  There is no other way out.”278 
 
The Chinese expression, “turtles in a flask” (瓮中之鳖, weng zhong zhi bie), denotes a hopeless 
situation, from which there is no escape.  Taiwan’s future is far from certain, but for these “Five 
Turtles in a Flask,” retrocession is a certain fate.     
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